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The Importance of Corporate Models: Economic and
Jurisprudential Values and the Future of Corporate Law
Professor Benedict Sheehy*
Every school of thought is like a man who has talked to himself for a
hundred years and is delighted with his own mind, however stupid it
may be.
J.W. Goethe, 1817, Principles of Natural Science
I. INTRODUCTION
Corporate law scholar, D. Millon, in his article "The Ambiguous
Significance of Corporate Personhood"' argues that much of the cur-
rent debate among scholars concerning the correct or most appropri-
ate model of the corporation is misguided. He argues that the debate
is misguided because it contributes little to the understanding of the
actual use and operation of the corporation in today's economy. As
well, he argues that the debate is not useful, as current jurisprudence
seems to have settled on a particular efficiency based model.2 Hence,
to the extent that the purpose of having the correct model for the
corporation is understanding actual use and operation of the corpora-
tion, at least some scholars would argue he is correct.
There are various approaches to the corporate model debate. One
approach to the debate includes a review of the history of the corpora-
tion, noting its privileged and public beginnings, the shift to the regis-
tration and limited liability corporations followed by a review of the
* Professor Sheehy teaches corporate and commercial law in the School of Law at the Uni-
versity of Newcastle, Australia. He would like to thank Dr. Helmut Linder of the European
School of Business, Reutlingen, and Dr. David Wetzell of the University of the Americas, Mex-
ico for their insightful comments, and Ms. Katharina Mirtsching for help with German law. In
addition, he would like to thank the Editor, Paige Barr, for making the publication process
simple.
1. David Millon, The Ambiguous Significance of Corporate Personhood, WASH. & LEE PUB.
L. & LEGAL THEORY RESEARCH PAPER SERIES, Working Paper No. 01-6, Jan., 2001.
2. See comment of Chancellor W. Allen, of the Delaware Court of Chancery, America's lead-
ing corporate law court, who views the nexus of contracts model of the corporation as "the
dominant legal academic view." Stephen Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative
Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856 at
n.8 1997 (citing William T. Allen, Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law, 50 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1395, 1399 (1993)).
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problems posed by the separation of management and shareholders. 3
Focusing on such things as legal fictions and nineteenth century legal
developments, however, hardly informs or guides issues of the twenty
first century. Another approach to the debate, largely informed by
political views, is the debate between contractarian and progressive
corporate law scholars.4 A third approach, which is comprised of an
effort to unravel the twisted jurisprudence is unlikely to be anymore
fruitful than the historical model debate.
Regardless of what else it is, the corporation is certainly a species of
firm-a group of people organized to raise funds and operate a profit-
able business. 5 The currently dominant model of the corporation, the
nexus of contracts model, emphasizes this profit aspect of the firm.
These discussions, however, fail to go far enough into the issue. The
issue is not "what is the corporation"? For to describe what some-
thing is, is not the same as to say what something should be.6 This
article is an effort to delve more deeply into the model and consider
what else the model should be.
The article commences with an introductory review of the current
model, noting in particular, its justification in economics. It will then
examine the values and assumptions of economics, challenging its
claim to provide value-free scientific knowledge. This critique of eco-
nomic science will lead to a discussion of the role and use of models.
Next, the article considers the compatibility of economics with juris-
prudence and makes some determinations about the inappropriate-
ness of the economic model dominating corporate law. Having done
so, the article will turn to examine some other models that have been
more effective in integrating jurisprudential values. Next it will turn
to the future and see where corporations are going, asking if the nexus
of contracts model will be adequate to deal with those additional chal-
3. This approach seems to be more common among British and Australian corporate law
scholars. See e.g., Janet Dine, THE GOVERNANCE OF CORPORATE GROUPS (2000); Stephen. Bot-
tomley, From Contractualism to Constitutionalism: A Framework for Corporate Governance,
SYDNEY L. REV. 277 (1997); J. Farrar, Frankenstein Incorporated or Fool's Parliament? Revisiting
the Concept of the Corporation in Corporate Governance, 10 BOND L. REV. 161 (1998).
4. See Paul N. Cox, The Public, The Private and The Corporation, 80 MARQ. L. REV.
391(1997); Bainbridge, supra note 2.
5. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm 4 ECONOMIA (NS) 386 (1937) forms the basis for
the landmark work in law and economics analysis of corporate law, FRANK EASTERBROOK &
DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991).
6. This distinction between descriptive or positive and normative is addressed extensively in
the realm of science and economics in particular in DANIEL M. HAUSMAN, THE INEXACT AND
SEPARATE SCIENCE OF ECONOMICS, (2002). See his first reference to the matter at p. 5. This
theme will be picked up and dealt with in greater detail within.
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lenges. Finally we will propose a few modifications that a new model
should perhaps include.
II. NEXUS OF CONTRACTS: THE CURRENT MODEL
The model currently in vogue is the nexus of contracts model.7
Bainbridge describes the model as follows:
the firm [is] not as a single entity, but is an aggregate of various
inputs acting together with the common goal of producing goods or
services. Employees provide labor. Creditors provide debt capital.
Shareholders provide equity capital, bear the risk of losses, and
monitor the performance of management. Management monitors
the performance of employees and coordinates the activities of all
the firm's inputs. The firm is simply a legal fiction repregenting the
complex set of contractual relationships between these inputs. In
other words, the firm is not an individual thing, but rather a nexus
or web of explicit and implicit contracts establishing rights and obli-
gations among the various inputs making up the firm.8
In this model, corporate law is nothing more than a provider of stan-
dard contract terms which are subject to the acceptance of the con-
tracting parties. As there is no such thing as a firm-which is merely a
legal fiction-what else can be binding the parties together other than
these contracts? Where people are unhappy with outcomes, they sim-
ply re-negotiate the contract or leave. In this view there is nothing
controversial; everything is voluntary and the wheels of commerce are
turning. Members of the corporation, just like members of a church,
come and go as they please. This nexus of contracts model is based on
an economics analysis of the firm,9 and accordingly, to understand
what if any controversy there may be, it is necessary to consider the
nature of economic science.
III. ECONOMICS: THE DISCIPLINE
Over the course of its brief history, economics has developed from
its home in the humanities into a social science dealing with decision
making and in particular, with predicting behaviour. It is essentially
the science developed to analyse the utility of resources, or perhaps
more properly, the science of allocation under conditions of scarcity. 10
Although American economics has by and large failed to address the
7. William T. Allen, Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1395, 1400 (1993).
8. Cox, supra note 4 at 859.
9. Coase, supra note 5.
10. LIONEL ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE
(1932).
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epistemological problems inherent to all science,'1 economics has pro-
vided valuable insights into and support for decisions concerning cre-
ating a "better society.' 12
Economists generally assume a utilitarian approach, 13 using theo-
ries to develop models about the way the world works.14 It is a long-
standing and famous criticism of economics that its modelling and the-
ory are quite removed from experience.15 As Nobel Laureate in eco-
nomics, Ronald Coase, observed:
Economics, over the years, has become more and more abstract and
divorced from events in the real world. Economists, by and large,
do not study the workings of the actual economics system. They
theorize about it. As Ely Devons, an English economist, once said
at a meeting "If economists wished to study the horse, they
wouldn't go and look at horses. They'd sit in their studies and say
to themselves, 'What would I do if I were a horse?""16
A. Normative or Positive?
Economics can be either normative or positive although the two are
usually combined. 17 Normatively, economics includes a broad array
11. The dearth of postmodern criticism of economics and general lack of requisite reflection
on the foundations of the discipline are nearly incredible to humanists. For an encouraging and
interesting tentative step in this direction, see Oxford economist, John Kay's musings
Postmodernism, Rationality Management FIN. TIMES 7 Mar., 2001. American economists since
HUTCHISON, TERRANCE. THE SIGNIFICANCE AND BASIC POSTULATES OF ECONOMICS THEORY
(1938), cited in DANIEL HAUSMAN, THE INEXACT AND SEPARATE SCIENCE OF ECONOMICS 153
(1992) reflect a reluctance to deal with this as can be seen in their reluctance to face the moral
basis fundamental to much of their work.
12. The notion of a "better society" of course begs the questions: Better for whom? And
Better by what standard? HAUSMAN, supra note 6, at 66. That these questions are rarely forth-
rightly addressed and debated openly is a fundamental criticism of economics addressed in this
paper. For the authoritative work on economics and philosophy see DANIEL HAUSMAN &
MICHAEL MCPHERSON, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND MORAL PHILOSPHY (1996).
13. LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 16 (1962); see also RICHARD POSNER, THE ECO-
NOMICS OF JUSTICE 48-60 (2nd ed. 1983) (Posner's discussion comparing economics and
utilitarianism).
14. The rather extensive and at times overzealous use of assumptions in economics is a source
of criticism both within and outside of the profession. As Cooter and Ulen light-heartedly re-
peat the comment, "the economist's prediction was correct but the economy went wrong." In
COOTER, ROBERT & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS ix(2nd ed. 1997).
15. See the interesting analysis of economists' mudslinging about theory in U. Maki, Against
Posner Against Coase Against Theory, 22 CAMBRIDGE J. OF ECONOMICS 587(1998). See also, U.
MAKI, FACT AND FICTION IN ECONOMICS: MODELS, REALISM AND SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION
(2002).
16. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL 15 (2000) (quoting RONALD COASE,
THE TASK OF SOCIETY).
17. For a simplified version, see Sir Richard Ivor's discussion on the difference between de-
scriptive and normative economics in law in his Address to Inaugural Law and Economics
Course in the newsletter of LAW & ECONOMICS ASSOCIATION OF NEW ZEALAND, Sept. 1997, at
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of values, perspectives and approaches to evaluating and allocating
society's resources. It includes ecological 18 and social values-less
often considered part of traditional economic analysis-and is advo-
cated and practiced by a broad range of economists from Amarta
Sen, 19 and Karl Polyani 20 to Frederick Hayek 21 and Ludwig von
Mises.22 Normative economists often evidence some humility,2 3 rec-
ognizing that economics is but one of many approaches to addressing
the problems of society, and in particular, the economic problems of
society.2 4 Normative economists openly seek to make recommenda-
tions about policy, and engage other interested parties on the value
questions facing society.
By way of contrast, another group of economists claim to be unin-
terested in the soft stuff of ethics and values and instead claim to be
doing pure science. This group describes itself as positivist. It
emerged from the philosophers, the logical positivists or empirical
positivists, of the early to mid part of the last century. Rather than
focusing on theory, the positivists concerned themselves with empiri-
cally observable phenomena. Initially, positive economics was a reac-
tion against some of the more philosophically minded economics of
the previous century. Positivist economists deny having a political
agenda. The champion of positivist economics is certainly Milton
Friedman. His 1953 essay, "The Methodology of Positive Econom-
ics," 25 was a landmark in the field, which although not well received,
was neither challenged successfully nor superceded. 26 As a result, it
remains a standard of economic methodology.2 7
3. Economics is simply put, not well suited to making these types of society shaping judgments.
B. Hsiung's "A Methodological Comparison of Ronald Coase and Gary Becker, AMERICAN LAW
AND ECON. REV. 186 (2001).
18. See e.g., Robert Costanza, What is Ecological Economics? 1(1) ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS
1-7 (1989); MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAw, AND THE ENVI-
RONMENT (1988).
19. AMARTYA SEN, ON ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1987).
20. KARL POLYANI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944).
21. Hayek's devotees have set up a webpage honouring him. See http://www.hayekcenter.org/
22. Von Mises has been taken up as the champion of right-wing, neo-liberals, although it is
likely he would not have agreed to any such affiliation. See the website of the Ludwig von Mises
Institute http://www.mises.org/.
23. See e.g., Ronald H. Coase, Economics and Contiguous Disciplines, 7 J. OF LEGAL ST., 201,
206-207 (1978); Hsuing, supra note 17.
24. Id.; Hsiung, supra note 17, at 188-189
25. MILTON FRIEDMAN, ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS (1953).
26. HAUSMAN, supra note 6 at 163, and see his note 17 id. for a substantial list of rejections of
Friedman's work.
27. Indeed, Hausman notes that it remains likely the only work on method that most econo-
mists read. Id.
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This distinction between positivist and normative economics, or
more accurately between the self-understanding of normative and
positivist economists, has created a difficulty in economics. The diffi-
culty is that the barrier between the positive and normative aspects of
the discipline is porous and indeed in much of the work of economics
the normative aspect is inescapable. As a positive science, economics
attempts to explain the laws governing observable phenomena. So,
economics attempts to explain the working of markets, decisions con-
cerning allocation of resources and such. Its theories, however, lead to
conclusions which easily lead into policy recommendations, and hence
positive economics becomes normative. Indeed, even prior to con-
ducting positive analysis, certain value assumptions need to be made,
and inevitably taint a "purely scientific" or empirical investigation.
Consider the simple example: economists define a certain type of deci-
sion as "rational." By definition, decisions that do not meet the crite-
ria are "irrational. '28 Clearly, no responsible policy advisor would
advocate an "irrational" policy. So, by creating the definition, the
economist has created a norm by which an analysis will be judged.
While within the constraints of economists' definitions of the terms,
they are likely correct, the transfer from theoretical investigation to
policy advice is highly problematic. Normative prescriptions are polit-
ical and as such should be debated. This view, however, conflicts with
the positivist economists' scientific claims which they say are not polit-
ical and so not subject to public debate. Accordingly, as just men-
tioned, economics floats precariously between positive and normative
modes seldom clearly separating the two, if indeed, such can be
done.29
B. Neo-Classical Economics
One branch of the positivist school, the neo-classical school, has
achieved considerable popularity.30 Neo-classical economists as posi-
tivists claim to be doing value free scientific inquiry31 and hence are
28. HAUSMAN, supra note 6, at 19.
29. Id at 13.
30. The moniker "neo-classical" is used here to denote economic theory that favours rational
choice theory, free markets, and monetary control of the economy. Neo-classical economics is
equated with economics generally in this paper because of its predominance and particularly in
law and economics. See HAUSMAN, supra note 6, at 3.
31. Indeed, there is no such thing as "value free" science, even in the hard. For the basic
philosophical discussion undermining science as a rational progressive enterprise, see THOMAS
KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2nd ed., 1970). As an attack on positivist
epistemology, the work of C. Levi-Strauss probably serves as a good starting point. Heilbroner
attacks the scientific model as appropriate for the study of economics in R. Heilbroner, Visions
and Analysis in the History of Economic Thought in P. PORTA, ET AL, KNOWLEDGE, SOCIAL
[Vol. 2:463
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not to be accountable or judged by the philosophical mores or con-
cerns of other economists or the larger social debate. Neo-classical
positivist economics is perhaps most commonly associated with the
New Chicago School after the 1960's.32
An important facet of the Chicago neo-classicists is the breadth of
application of economic method. It is breath-taking: Chicago econo-
mist Gary Becker states, "I am saying that the economic approach
provides a valuable unified framework for understanding all human
behaviour. ' 33 Neo-classical positive economics tends to lack the
humility of normative economics and is fairly subjected to the criti-
cism of "economic imperialism. '34
Contrary to its initial position as a positivist approach (and arguably
inevitably) neo-classical economics has moved well beyond positive
economics and developed a strong set of normative recommendations
about how society should be organized and how resources should be
allocated to meet those objectives. 35
INSTITUTIONS AND THE DIVISION OF LABOUR 59-63 (2001). As applied in corporate law, see
Thomas W. Joo, Corporations Theory and Corporate Governance Law: Contract, Property, and
the Role of Metaphor in Corporate Law. 35 U.C. DAvis L. REV 779 (2002) who observes, "rules
of corporate law are often based on social welfare judgments of judges, lawmakers, and regula-
tors rather than on parties' bargains in the marketplace. It misleadingly suggests that the law
imposes no value judgments but merely rubber stamps freely made individual decisions. Thus,
the model lulls us into thinking we can avoid the hard questions of how the law makes its value
judgments." Id. at 778.
32. For a review of economic intellectual history, see ROBERT L. HEILBRONER. THE
WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS (rev. ed., 161). For a brief summary of the Chicago School, see New
School of Social Research's history of economics website at http://www.cepa.newschool.edu/het/
schools/chicago.htm.
33. GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14 (1976). Although
not all Economists agree with Becker in this respect, most would agree that one can explain
much "social" and "political" behavior by reference to the pursuit of one's self-interest. Taken at
face value, Becker claims to have outstripped Einstein in finding a unified "theory of every-
thing" (in this case, human behaviour). It is difficult to take Becker's claim as anything more
than advancing his political agenda/normative economic vision, since surely he realizes that as it
stands it amounts to little more than sophomoric nonsense.
34. RICHARD SWEDBERG, ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY. In addition, for a criticism of the
economic analysis of law, see, for instance, Robert Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value? 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 191 (1980); ROBIN MALLOY, LAW AND ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE-
ORY AND PRACTICE (1990); Richard A. Epstein, Law and Economics: Its Glorious Past and
Cloudy Future, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1167 (1997): and Martha Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations: The
Philosophical Critique of (a Particular Type of) Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197 (1997). As
observed by economist, Abba Lerner, "Economics has gained the title of queen of the social
science by choosing solved political problems as its domain." Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis,
Revenge of Homo Economicus: Contested Exchange and the Revival of Political Economy. 7(1) J.
OF ECON. PERSP., 83-102, at 86 (1993) (citing The Economics and Politics of Consumer Sover-
eignty, 62(2) AMERICAN ECONOMICS REV. 258-266 (1972)).
35. For discussion of positive economics, see Milton Friedman, Positive Economics in DANIEL
M. HAUSMAN, ED. THE PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS, 210-244 (1990).
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C. Values in Neo-Classical Economics
To understand neo-classical economics, one needs to understand its
assumptions. These are:36 1) all human behaviour is individualistic; 2)
all human behaviour is exclusively self-interested; 3) all human beha-
viour is rational and humans are no more than "rational utility maxi-
mizers"; 37 4) welfare is merely and wholly the satisfaction of an
individual's material preferences; 5) efficiency is the exclusive mea-
sure of desirability; and 6) unfettered markets are the best way to per-
mit people to achieve their self-interested objectives, and achieve
allocative efficiency. Each of these assumptions has a significant nor-
mative implication to which we now turn.
Methodological individualism carries with it the notion that all stud-
ies, analysis and recommendations should be designed to enhance in-
dividual interests as opposed to those of society. As a result, social
interests are either not considered or minimized. In fact, community
concerns do not exist for the more thorough-going methodological in-
dividualist. Any efforts to promote policies that create a sense of
community, solidarity, or coordinated approached to problem solving
are actively opposed as "irrational."
The commitment to self-interest as the only motivating force,38 also
has normative implications. It does not allow for volunteerism, altru-
ism, and such other motives which permit civil society to function.
Voting, for example, is a necessary activity to maintain democracy.
Yet economists are hard pressed to explain why people vote from the
self-interested paradigm. Why would one vote? A single vote is negli-
gible in an election. Even at a theoretical level, economists recognize
basic game theoretic problems such as the prisoner's dilemma cannot
be solved without cooperation-that is something beyond self-inter-
est.39 Nevertheless, because of this self-interested assumption, poli-
cies that would promote cooperation and coordination in society are
rejected.
36. HAUSMAN, supra note 6, at 51 sets out seven laws from which are derive the assumptions
set out here. The one selected from this set of seven are the ones most crucial to this paper.
37. The famous homo economicus is what I am referring to. For an economist's criticism of
this model of human behaviour see Richard Thaler, Homo Economicus, 14(1) J. OF ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVES 133-141 (2000).
38. Economists have certainly sought other and broader models; however, because of theoret-
ical problems associated with exponential increases in complexity in addition to other concerns
have kept other models from being used. See for example of a more complex model Michael C.
Jensen & William H. Meckling. The Nature of Man [sic] J. OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE 4-
19 (1994). On the problem generally, see Richard Thaler, supra note 37.
39. See HAUSMAN, supra note 6, at 180-193.
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Positivist commitment to rationality, while appealing at a common-
sense level, is highly problematic. Beyond the obvious criticism of
common-sense that can be drawn from the comment: "There's only
one way of looking at a thing, and that's the right way,"' 40 it imports
other serious, value-laden, and contestable assumptions, not the least
of which is that psychologists have demonstrated that humans are un-
able to make rational decisions without emotions.41 Furthermore, the
rationality of a thing depends on the correctness and completeness of
the assumptions chosen, not to mention the agreement among the
economists and policy advisors concerning which assumptions should
be chosen in the first place.
As mentioned, generally speaking no one would advocate a policy
of irrationality,42 but where rationality is too narrowly defined it fails
to meet human needs or address human concerns. Human interests in
things such as art, entertainment, and leisure are excluded. The policy
implications are clear: where something is not "rational" as defined by
the economists, it is to be rejected and policies designed to advance
"irrational" activities such as art and culture are to be thwarted.
Economists' focus on the satisfaction of individual material prefer-
ences has both its own set of assumptions and its own normative pol-
icy implications. The assumption is that humans are insatiable: they
want unlimited amounts of everything, and then more. It also equates
well-being with satisfying material preferences. 43 This equation of
well-being with material possessions is not only empirically, demon-
strably completely wrong,44 but has two other very unfortunate policy
consequences. It promotes over-consumption of the planet's limited
resources and ignores the more satisfying contribution of the non-ma-
terial things such as love, beauty, and mind. It creates pressure to
substitute things for people, which of course ultimately leads to a di-
minished value being placed on people. A life with more things but
40. Elizabeth von Arnim's character Everad favoured this expression in her novel, VERA.
Quoted in MONK, RAY. BERTRAND RUSSELL: THE GHOST OF MADNESS 1921-1970, at 85 (2000).
41. See, for example, the case of "Elliot," an individual who as a result of the loss of emotions,
despite a high level of intelligence, found rational decision making nearly impossible. DAMASIO,
ANTONIO DESCARTES' ERROR (1994).
42. Irrationality has been a policy of both Israel and the USA in presenting an image to the
world. In the Strategic Command's publication, Essentials of Post-Cold War Deterrence (1995),
it was advocated that the United States portray itself as "irrational and vindictive" as "it hurts to
portray ourselves as too fully rational and cool-headed." NOAM CHOMSKY & EDWARD SAID,
AcTs OF AGGRESSION: POLICING "ROGUE" STATES, 29 (1999).
43. HAUSMAN, supra note 6, at 57-59.
44. Daniel Blanchflower & Andrew Oswald, Money, Sex and Happiness: An Empirical Study,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 10499 (2004), available at http://
www.nber.org/papers/w10499.
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less people, is a life with more emptiness and depression, which is in-
creasingly common in the developed countries that have focused on
having more things.45
This focus on material consumption, which follows from equating
well-being with consumption, has three policy implications. First, it
focuses on facilitating increased consumption as a policy guide or
value. Second, it minimizes the value of non-consumables. Third, it
focuses policy, logically, on profit maximization, instead of things that
truly increase the human sense of satisfaction and happiness.
The neo-classicist economists have selected efficiency as the pri-
mary means for society to increase its wealth.46 Efficient policies are
those that carry the lowest cost, but to do so such policies must pro-
mote standardization, decrease diversity, and increase pressure on
those effected. This focus on efficiency in process tends to promote a
blindness to outcomes. It also devalues people as in the choice be-
tween resource conservation and human well-being, it prefers the for-
mer over the latter. Policies which do not promote efficiency, while
possibly increasing things like equality in society of the quality of life,
will be opposed.
Finally, with the view that markets are the best means of distribut-
ing goods and services, neo-classical positivists oppose any efforts to
create balance or equity in society. Neo-classicists believe that the
value of a good is to be determined by examining which party is will-
ing and able to pay the most for it. Thus in any contest, a party with
the most money to spend on a thing gets it. There is no allowance for
the interests of weaker parties, or parties without resources, or the
fact that markets are inherently incomplete. 47 Distribution of re-
sources has nothing to do with merit or need.48 The issue is to maxi-
mize wealth in society to permit the maximization of preferences vis-
A-vis goods and services. It favours the war of all against all which in
the market context is called "competition."
The constraints imposed by these assumptions cause neo-classical
economists to select as their phenomenon of study in wealth and in
particular, wealth maximization (although some would argue that neo-
classicists are merely arguing utility, for all intents and purposes this
45. Id.
46. Hsiung, The Success of Law and Economics: A Methodological Interpretation 14 (noting
"For economists, using efficiency as the criterion of judgment is almost beyond dispute.").
47. Bruce Greenwald & Joseph Stiglitz, Externalities in Economies with Imperfect Information
and Incomplete Markets, 1010:2 QUARTERLY J. or, ECONOMics, 229 (1986).
48. Neo-classical economics is biased against the less wealth members of society HAUSMAN,
supra note 6, at 58 & 64.
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translates directly into wealth). Their modelling and advocacy is fo-
cused on wealth maximization as the ultimate objective of social
organization.49
D. Additional Problems in Economics
At this point, of course, economists are no longer engaged in posi-
tive economics. Instead, they have moved into normative economics
by advancing wealth maximization as society's objective and efficiency
as the measure of all things.50 What makes this argument about value
norms difficult is this conflation of normative and positive economics,
and particularly the neo-classical positivist claim of doing value-free
science. 51
To see this conflation of positive and normative economics, consider
the example of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. Neo-classical positivists fol-
lowing Kaldor-Hicks efficiency advocate transacting all transactions
that results in increased total wealth, regardless of the desires of the
parties and without compensation to the losing party.52 From the per-
spective of the neo-classicist, there is nothing controversial about this
advocacy; there is nothing to be discussed. The proposed transactions,
a) increase wealth, and b) are efficient. Think of the contrary: Who
prefers decreased wealth and inefficiency?
What they fail to mention is that the wealth created through these
transactions is it increases wealth concentration. This increased con-
centration results because where other efficiency measures are applied
to the transaction, whose measurements require wealth gains be dis-
tributed to all parties, the number of transactions drops to nearly nil.53
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, which permits one-sided, non-compensated
gains, was adopted as the appropriate model and such efficient trans-
49. See for example, Pareto efficiency or Kaldor-Hicks theorems. See also POSNER, supra
note 13 at 88-119.
50. One very important consequence of this position is that it implicitly validates the existing
distribution of wealth. They oppose all attempts at reallocation as "rent-seeking and rent-
keeping."
51. See for example, Posner's claims concerning his use of Pareto efficiency or Kaldor-Hicks
theorems, POSNER, supra note 13 at 88-119. Concerning the conflation of positive and normative
economics, see DANIEL M. HAUSMAN & MICHAEL MCPHERSON, TAKING ETHICS SERIOUSLY:
ECONOMICS AND CONTEMPORARY MORAL PHILOSOPHY 31 (1993).
52. See the discussion of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency in MATTHEW ADLER & ERIC POSNER EDS.,
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES (2000),
Kaldor-Hicks as applied in Calabresi and Malamed's view of property law in Guido Calabresi &
Douglas Malamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral
85 HARVARD L. REV. 1089 (1972).
53. HAUSMAN, supra note 6, at 60-64.
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actions were advocated, regardless of the injustice done to the non-
compensated parties.
The other contestable claim is that no one prefers inefficiency over
efficiency. Consider, however, that the value of efficiency in killing a
group of people targeted for execution. It depends completely on the
perspective. From the perspective of the killers, efficiency is an im-
portant value. From the perspective of the victims, inefficiency is the
highest value. The value of efficiency, therefore, depends on the ends
which it seeks to achieve as well as the perspectives one takes. Fur-
thermore, it is generally recognized that efficiency is not an ultimate
end. It is an immediate end. That is, the value of efficiency is not
efficiency itself, but as a means to a more desirable end, whether it be
more chocolates or a faster firing gun.
Thus, while efficiency is clearly an important value,5 4 it can hardly
be the fundamental or organizing value or principle of a society.55 In
Sir Richard Ivor's understatement: "A society where everyone is in-
tent on maximizing their own wealth has its limitations. '' 56 Efficiency
may require killing off the excess humans or enslaving some other
humans. 57 Even neo-classicist Chicagoan, Milton Friedman acknowl-
edges efficiency cannot be the driving force of society. He wrote, "I
would favour a free society even if it were less productive than some
54. Hsiung observes that "For economists, using efficiency as the criterion of judgment is al-
most beyond dispute, but for some legal scholars at least, they find it difficult to accept the idea
of efficiency as applied to studying legal studies." Hsiung, supra note 46 at 14.
55. Societies have been organized around religion, social class, social relationships, artistic
ability, warriors' power etc. It is important to recognize that each of these societies considered
itself to be "the best, most advanced etc." This recognition must bring a bit of humility to our
evaluation of our economically driven society. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY
AND THE LAST MAN (1992), and particularly his concluding chapter.
56. Ivor, supra note 17, at 3. Posner would argue not only that it is possible, but that society
in fact does organize itself and its laws on the basis of efficiency. See his chapters "A Theory of
Primitive Society" and "The Economic Theory of Primitive Law" in POSNER, supra note 13, at
146-173 and 174-206 respectively.
57. Posner recognizes this as a valid criticism of traditional utilitarian based economics in Pos-
NER, supra note 13, at 54. While his theory successfully dodges this problem with utilitarianism,
its error is equally egregious if not more pernicious in restricting all discussion and allocation of
the world's resources to those with the sufficient economic resources to acquire them. Posner
argues that he and his fellow court of appeal judges are just average, ordinary citizens. It is hard
to imagine how a person who could afford a minimum of seven years education, practice law for
the requisite period earning an average lawyer's salary, and have the political connections and
prestige to be appointed appeal court judges are to be considered simply the average person.
For further discussion and a more fundamental criticism of Posner's view see those raised by Neil
S. Siegel, Sen and the Hart of Jurisprudence: A Critique of the Economic Analysis of Judicial
Behavior, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 1581 (2000).
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alternative-say a slave society... because my basic value is freedom
itself."58
The problem, quite simply is that all the neo-classical positivists'
prescriptions for social organization revolve around increasing wealth
by increasing efficiency. 59 Any brake on efficiency is seen as wrong,
erroneous, unscientific, and directing society down the wrong path. It
is "irrational. '60 If scientists were to use the language of ethics-
which they sometimes slip into-they would argue that inefficiency is
an immoral, evil waste of money. While there is certainly some valid-
ity to seeking ways to increase a society's wealth and not squander
resources, to ignore all other values, including justice, mercy, happi-
ness, freedom, security, and welfare in the process is certainly a
roadmap to social disaster.61
Yet, for neo-classical economists, the ultimate end-the increased
monetary wealth in society62-is the sole, exclusive and ultimate
Good. 63 This "social" outcome is a rather curious conflation, if not
outright contradiction, of the assumption of methodological
individualism.
58. Milton Friedman, Free Markets and Free Speech, 10 HARVARD J. LAW & PUB. POL'Y 1
(1987). But to be consistent, should not Friedman then be developing an economics based on
freedom as the ultimate value instead of efficiency?
59. To argue the opposite-that a society should be organized around creating inefficiency-
fails to grasp the point of the discussion. The issue is not whether efficiency is an important
value. Rather, the concern is whether is should be the sole or ultimate value or organizing
principle of a society.
60. Before concluding that it is "irrational", however, one must consider the nature of ration-
ality in economics, and in particular bounded rationality. Given the limited and imperfect char-
acter of the information we possess and the developing understanding of fuzzy concepts and
chaos theory, conclusions about "irrationality" should carry a significant caveat-namely, that a
choice or decision may be "irrational" but only so in the model being used.
61. Interestingly, one of the supposed champions of neo-classical economists, von Mises con-
sidered these values as important and important in economic analysis. His concerns for these
values tend to be completely missed by his later admirers who take him to be a neo-liberal, neo-
conservative economist without social concern. The issues related to social costs were first
brought up by Arthur Cecil Pigou which he addressed as externalities. While scientists can
hardly be faulted for not addressing such values, the issue of economic science, which deals with
such issues, is called into question as we shall see later. Posner has dealt with happiness in his
readable and thoughtful criticism of utilitarianism; however, his wealth maximization principle
does not address this issue any better-perhaps a criticism he himself recognized. See POSNER,
supra note 13, at 52.
62. Views clarified and argued by POSNER, supra note 13.
63. See POSNER, supra note 13, ch. 3, in which he sets out his theory of "wealth maximization"
and specifically deals with it in chapter 4 "The Ethical and Political Basis of Wealth Maximiza-
tion" as an ethical theory, in POSNER, supra note 8, at 48-115 and in Robin Malloy and Richard
Posner in Debate: Is Law and Economics Moral? 24 VAL. U. L REV. 147. Interestingly, in his
1997 Oliver Wendell Holmes lectures he denies completely having ethical concerns. His most
distinguished opponent, Robert Dworkin, challenges the views expressed in the Holmes Lec-
tures in Robert Dworkin, Darwin's New Bulldog, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1718 (1998).
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The problem of economics positivism and values is exacerbated in
that once neo-classical positivist economists have made their value
judgments concerning wealth and efficiency; further discussions of
right and wrong, moral or immoral are ignored or dismissed as mean-
ingless.64 While appropriate for a science to dismiss such discussion,
at least in some views, it is questionable methodologically to deny or
stifle the a priori value debate in science, particularly where the selec-
tion of values is at the foundation of the method and therefore deter-
minative of outcomes. 65
Methodologically neo-classical evaluation begins with the status
quo as the benchmark.66 Next, it selects and delimits a phenomenon
for consideration. As a science, it needs numerical data as applying
numerical values permits quantification. As Daniel Hausman, a phi-
losopher of economics, states it: "strategies for beating phenomena
into mathematically tractable shape," 67 and then creates a mathemati-
cal model for establishing a point of reference. Finally, it adopts a
value which it uses as a criterion for advocating or opposing a particu-
lar allocation, or predicting a particular behaviour. 68 Each of the steps
in the method is an exercise in value selection. Determining the na-
ture of the economic project is a highly evaluative enterprise. 69
Economics has another fundamental problem when it comes to
matters of distribution. In fact, as Kenneth Arrow has demonstrated,
one cannot create the conditions for creating an economically equita-
ble distribution. 70 In other words, the status quo, despite its increas-
ing inequalities, is more equitable from an economist's point of view
than any other possible redistribution. This perspective arises not
from the reality but from the procrustean constraints of the disci-
pline's perspective, 71 and with respect to the neo-classical positivists,
the previously discussed Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.
64. See e.g., Richard Posner, 1997 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures: The Problematics of Moral
and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1637 (1998). Hausman refers to this as "excessive
confidence."
65. This stronger view of the role of the researcher's bias interestingly finds its roots in the
natural sciences, and particularly with the phenomenon of researcher observation creating the
phenomena in subatomic particle physics.
66. HAUSMAN, supra note 6, at 14.
67. Id. at 84.
68. See Hsiung, supra note 46, at 7-10. Curiously, Hsiung does not identify the value laden
activities of selection, delimitation or modeling as part of the economic method.
69. Noted and discussed in Hsiung, supra note 46, at 10, note 33.
70. HAUSMAN, supra note 6, at 64-65 (citing SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES
(1963); Values and Collective Decision Making, Repr. In FRANK HAHN & MARTIN HOLLIS PHI-
LOSOPHY AND ECONOMICS 110-126 (1979)).
71. HAUSMAN, supra note 6, at 65. Hausman notes this is a problem resulting from the "im-
poverished" basis of economic theory, a position, supported by Sen.
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A further problem confronting economic analysis results from the
discussion narrowed beyond numerization to discussion of things that
can be monetized. 72 While this limitation may be insignificant in the
discussion of economy, there can hardly be anything more significant
to a discussion of human life. Health, happiness, family, friends and a
sense of fulfilment-the most important things in life-simply are not
subject to monetization.73 Finally, economists' focus on satisfaction of
individual preferences in consumption of goods and services under-
mines these and other highly valued aspects of human society, includ-
ing fairness and justice.
Neo-classical positivist economists' selection of a few favoured val-
ues protecting the status quo and total rejection of alternative values
is highly inappropriate. In the academy it amounts to dishonesty.
The discipline most suited to developing value judgments is not a
mathematically focused discipline such as economics. Mathematics
delivers rules for working with numbers: it does not prescribe how
numbers are to be applied to social phenomena. Rather, value judg-
ments are properly the province of philosophers. Although earlier in
its history economics was affiliated with philosophy and the humani-
ties, it abandoned that approach in favour of a scientific methodol-
ogy.74 Economists must continue to make value decisions as it is part
of their discipline; however, they must abandon their claim to be con-
ducting pure science and producing scientific knowledge. And un-
doubtedly, the philosophers would be delighted to have further
participants in their engaging debates.
Of course, not all economists are blind to this problem in their disci-
pline. As noted economist Robert Heilbroner observes: "economics,
in its 'purest' form is intrinsically and inescapably ideological. '75 He
goes on to note: "what is essential, then, is to become aware of one's
socio-political values, not to pretend they do not exist. ' 76
Although this discussion of values in economics has been somewhat
lengthy, it has been necessary as it forms the basis of much of what
follows. What is critical to take from the discussion is that economics
is not a value free science any more than law is a value free endeav-
72. See discussion of money and monetary system in DE SOTO, supra note 16 at 43-44, 63.
73. Both Posner and Becker recognize the difficulty and overriding importance of non-mone-
tized events and values. They have taken different approaches in dealing with them. Posner has
acknowledge them, but largely been silent (see POSNER, supra note 13 at 64). Becker, by way of
contrast, has applied his method even to such thorny issues as marriage, family and free time.
GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1976).
74. Heilbroner, supra note 31.
75. Id. at 63.
76. Id. at 61.
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our. Further, the values of economics, although seldom identified and
discussed, permeate much western thinking and in particular, as we
shall see next, legal development.
IV. LAW AND ECONOMICS
There are good reasons for connecting law and economics, not the
least of which is that law lacks a method,77 while economics lacks a
particular field. 78 In fact, the role of economics in legal analysis has
blossomed since Coase's critical 1960 contribution "The Problem of
Social Cost."' 79 In that article he demonstrated that an economic ap-
proach to a nuisance problem, instead of a legal approach, led to a
different outcome, and more importantly, to more efficient outcome.80
In this and other areas of law, this combination of law and economics
has produced some good results and as a result it has developed a
strong position in the academy. 8' In fact, it has developed to the point
that, as one scholar puts it:
economic analysis in legal scholarship has become so de rigueur that
even those who refuse to view economics as the Holy Grail of
knowledge are compelled to use economics in their scholarship.
82
The economics adopted by law and economics scholars tends to be
neo-classical positivist economics. 83 Hence, law and economics schol-
ars both follow and advocate efficiency, individualism, self-interest,
materialism, rationalism, markets, and wealth maximization, as the
77. See Wetlaufer's review of the six main approaches (largely mutually exclusive) to legal
method in the last century. Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Systems Of Belief In Modern American Law: A
View From Century's End, 49 Am. U.L. Rev. 12 (1999).
78. The vast array of approaches of legal method and fundamental disagreements are the
topic of a very learned paper by Gerald B. Wetlaufer, supra note 77 and the lack of a well-
defined subject matter is discussed in HAUSMAN, supra note 6, at 2-3.
79. Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 111 J. OF LAW OF ECONOMICS 1 (1960).
80. One can see here already, the normative over-taking the positive and the traditional legal
solutions. Interestingly, Coase states that his objective in the article is merely to point out alter-
native ways of organizing society. He is not concerned that the market should be arranging
things nor that efficiency is the correct basis for making judgments in every instance.
81. For an enlightening discussion of this phenomenon, see Hsiung, supra note 46.
82. Alex Y. Seita, Common Myths in the Economic Analysis of Law, B.Y.U. L. REV. 993, 995-
997 (1989).
83. See for a general discussion of the development of economics in expending beyond the
Economics Department, and particularly, into law, Hsiung, supra note 46. For some of the criti-
cisms of law and economics see ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW AND MARKET ECONOMY: REINTER-
PRETING THE VALUES OF LAW AND ECONOMY (2001). For a remarkably insightful and thorough
article concerning the a priori philosophical and political values and commitments of scholars
and relating them to corporate law, see Cox, supra note 4. Unfortunately, law and economics
scholars tend to draw their economics from law texts and as a result tend to view the modified
economics explanations offered therein instead of seeing what economists and philosophers of
economists state.
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fundamental principles of all social organization 84 and as such are the
basis for and purpose of law.
This meeting of law and arguably outdated8 5 neo-classical positive
economics 86 is seen by some law and economics scholars, including no
less a noteworthy than Judge Posner,87 as the ideal. In the view of
84. The obsession with size in America, and particularly the idea that larger is better, is sub-
ject to many criticisms. In this particular case, one cannot but help make the analogy of crani-
ometry-the "science" of brain size, founded by Paul Broca and Samuel Morton, and the
"science" of wealth maximization where in both instances bigger is "better" without a deep
understanding what "better" really is. Craniometry disappeared from the academy when it was
realized and admitted that the evidence did not bear out the hypothesis. One can only hope that
the neo-classicists will have the integrity and graciousness to take note of the evidence and fol-
low that example.
85. See criticisms below concerning postmodernism and economics. Also, see Amartya Sen's
criticism of the mechanistic method to economic analysis applied by contemporary economic
theory which method he sees as its "major deficiency." AMARTYA SEN, ETHICS AND ECONOMICS
28 (1987). Douglas A. Kysar, observed, "The preanalytic vision which informed the develop-
ment of neoclassical thought was that of a world in which human activity was but a tiny fraction
of global activity. Human use of resources and production of wastes was considered costless
because the regenerative and absorptive capacities of the earth appeared to have no limits. To-
day, evidence to the contrary arrives with regularity, to the point that the Royal Society of
London and the United States National Academy of Sciences issued an unprecedented joint
action statement, warning: "The future of our planet is in the balance. Sustainable development
can be achieved, but only if irreversible degradation of the environment can be halted in time.
The next 30 years may be crucial." In Douglas A. Ksyar, Sustainability, Distribution, and the
Macroeconomic Analysis of Law, 43 B.C. L. REV 1, 70-71(2001).
86. The dearth of postmodern criticism of economics and general lack of requisite reflection
on the foundations of the discipline are nearly incredible to humanists. For an encouraging and
interesting tentative step in this direction, see Oxford economist, John Kay's musings
Postmodernism, Rationality Management, FIN. TIMES March 7, 2001. See also R. Rossini
Favretti, Interpretation and Representation in the Discourse of Economics, in P. PORTA ET AL
supra note 31.
87. In much of the discussion that follows, I have taken Posner as the leading exemplar of law
and economics positivists. As will be evident, my disagreement with Posner about the correct
location of efficiency in the schemata of social values, leads to a number of criticisms of his
positions. I have made an effort not to fall into the error some scholars engaged in the debate
who tend to argue with caricatures of other positions rather than the real positions-an error
identified by Cox. Cox, supra note 4, at 401. Instead, I have developed my criticisms from read-
ing of Posner. In my reading of Posner's work his views appear to have become reified, more
extreme and hence less nuanced over time. This trend makes it more difficult to access and
assess his later work and accordingly, most of the discussion below deals with his earlier work,
The Economics of Justice. My disagreement with Posner's thinking and views should not be read
as a denigration of his clever and thoughtful consideration of the issues he touches. It is an
intellectual disagreement, with openness to competing values, much as he demonstrated in his
earlier writings. At this time in his career, although not value-free as none of us are, at least he
appeared open to considering alternative values, and it is in this spirit that I intend to offer this
work and criticism. As Cunningham in his thorough and critical analysis of Posner's claims
notes: "no single view or approach endorsed by all proponents of economic analysis of the legal
system, one viewpoint has remained the most prominent-that of Judge Richard Posner."
Whitney Cunningham, Testing Posner's Strong Theory of Wealth Maximization. 81 GEo. L.J. 141
(1992). A legitimate argument could be made that Richard Epstein also of Chicago and the
most cited law and economics legal scholar should serve as exemplar. Available at http://
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these law and economics scholars, law is the practical application or
implementation of economic science. Law allocates costs to where it
is most efficient to do so regardless of whether the cost can be borne
by the involuntary recipient. 88 The general idea is to bring scientific
certainty, objectivity and impartiality to legal decisions. 89 Law, as a
collection of principles, doctrines, institutions, and enforcement is
merely a tool for maximizing the utility of various competing claims
and maximizing efficiency. It is the hand-maiden of economics as the
best suited among society's tools for making specific decisions and im-
plementing those decisions, giving rise to and increasing society's
overall wealth.90
V. LAW AND ECONOMICS AND CORPORATE LAW
Corporate law, according to this view is one spoke in the wheel of
efficient tools and is to be developed, interpreted and applied extrapo-
lating along this line for the exclusive purpose of increasing the overall
wealth in society. This economic role of the corporation is the focus
of analysis once one has come to the conclusion that the corporation is
merely an economic arrangement and that corporate law is exclusively
about increasing efficiency by such things as providing more efficient
default contracting, or by facilitating financing. 91 It is argued that the
economic focus increases society's welfare by assisting in fulfilling the
obligations of business.92 Indeed as argued famously by Milton Fried-
man, the social good achieved by a business corporation is producing
a profit. As he wrote in his controversial 1970 article: "the one and
www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/bleiter/rankingsO2/most-cited.html. My reason for focusing on Pos-
ner is his long career, his efforts to balance and consider his thinking in light of his judicial
practice, his prominence in the Law and economics approach as just noted, and his efforts to
communicate his views to the non-academic universe make him an important voice for the posi-
tivist economics perspective among the populous.
88. This is the fundamental contribution of Coase, supra note 51.
89. MALLOY, supra note 83 at 5. Again, the idea of any science, let alone a social science,
being certain, objective or value-free, no longer has credibility. The foundational work criticiz-
ing economics' pretensions to being value-free science was done by Robert Heilbroner. Econom-
ics as 'Value Free' Science, 40 Soc. RES. 129 (1973). See discussion of postmodernism above
Rossini Favretti, supra note 86. See also the discussion of Critical Theory in DAVID
BRAYBROOKE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE (1987) and various Critical Legal Studies
theorists such as Duncan Kennedy.
90. This aspect of Posner's thought are discussed succinctly in Michael Rosenfeld, Pragma-
tism, Pluralism And Legal Interpretation: Posner's And Rorty's Justice Without Metaphysics
Meets Hate Speech, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 97, 121 (1996).
91. This is the argument in EASTERBROOK, supra note 5.
92. See e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Maximization, Stakeholder Theory and the Corporate Objec-
tive Function, 14 J. OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE 3 (2001).
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only social responsibility of business-to use its resources and engage
in activities designed to increase its profits. 93
In fact, Friedman pushed his argument for a profit focus further
when he argued that the fundamental freedom of society is properly
equated with the pursuit of shareholder wealth. 94 He argued that this
profit focus is diametrically opposed to and mutually exclusive of any
other corporate social responsibility, including care for the environ-
ment, worker health and safety among other objectives. In that same
article he wrote: "Few trends could so thoroughly undermine the very
foundations of our free society as the acceptance by corporate officials
of a social responsibility other than to make as much money for their
stockholders as possible. '95
This emphasis on shareholder wealth is one important aspect of
economists' support for the nexus of contracts model also known as
the shareholder primacy model. The other main supports are eco-
nomics' methodological individualism and materialism. This model
holds, as Friedman advocates, that the only valid focus of managers is
the well-being of the shareholders, and more narrowly, only their fi-
nancial well-being. For all intents and purposes, no other beings, in-
terests, or even times exist. As previously noted, the contractarian
model holds that the corporation is nothing but a legal fiction. It is
merely freely contracting individuals-their legal equality taken to be
identical or irrelevant to actual bargaining equality. The shareholder
primacy model places the highest value on the contribution of the
shareholders. 96
Law and economics, however, fails to take note of a critical and
fundamental difference between law and economics. As Joseph
Singer playfully puts it, drawing from T.H. White's character Balin
"There is something important in humanity . . . I cannot at present
describe it. ' ' 97 Singer identifies the issue of fairness as one of law's
particular contributions to society and suggests, among other things,
93. The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits, NY TIMES MAG., Sept. 13,
1970, at 32-33, 122, 124, 126.
94. A similar view is taken up by business scholars Michael Jensen and William Meckling in
an alarmist, radical, and in hindsight clearly incorrect, article Between Freedom and Democracy,
THE BANKER, Oct. 1977.
95. Friedman, supra note 93.
96. For a discussion of the two main models see, Benedict Sheehy, Scrooge-the Reluctant
Stakeholder: Theoretical Problems in the Shareholder-Stakeholder Debate, 12 U. OF MIAMI Bus.
L. REV. (2004).
97. Joseph Singer, Something Important in Humanity, 37 HARV. C.R. C.L. L. REV. 103 (2002)
(quoting T.H. WHITE, THE BOOK OF MERLYN.
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that the answers proposed by economists98 fail to meet the needs,
desires, and aspirations fundamental to human nature. We now turn
to examine some of these desires as they are valued and protected in
law.
VI. LAW AND SOCIAL VALUES
Is arbitration of disputes with an eye to increasing of societal wealth
the total or whole and complete role of law? Such a view would
hardly appeal to the average citizen.99 Indeed, from the perspective of
the average citizen, law that only adds and subtracts wealth would be
exceedingly strange. Courthouses are not called the "House of Eco-
nomics" and nor do the scales in the hands of the blindfolded Goddess
of Justice, Themis, contain gold coins or stacked dollar bills. Rather,
the scales hold a human heart. These figures are symbolic of values
other than the neo-classical economists' values of individualism,
wealth, self-interest, rationalism, materialism and efficiency. They
symbolize something we call "Justice." The difficulty of defining the
term justice, although notorious, need not force us to declare it mean-
ingless and throw up our hands in defeat. Rather, it is a vague term-
a term that by definition is not wholly or readily definable. 00
Law is concerned not only with economic efficiency, but with things
we call retribution, personal responsibility, 101 fairness, 10 2 and a just so-
ciety. 10 3 It is a discipline extending well beyond the horizons of eco-
nomic inquiry 104 looking to aspirations for individual human beings
and also those some ends for society as a whole. Its framework is not
98. Singer's concern is with welfare economics, and in particular the work of Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001). See Singer, supra note
97.
99. Both law and economics escape the grasp of the average citizen. Law's highly technical
reasoning is simply beyond most people's interest or ability, as Posner has noted, and economic
analysis is either objectionable or in some models too technical, see Hsiung, supra note 46.
100. On the growing recognition of importance of vagueness in science and mathematics, see
the R. Sorenson, Vagueness, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Fall Ed. 2001), availa-
ble at http://plato.standford.edu/archives/fall.
101. The role of personal responsibility in the development of the human personality is cen-
tral to much philosophy, from the idea of individual responsibility in Aristotle's virtue ethics to
the Existentialists' angst and personal quest for meaning, as well as psychology including such
thinkers as Karl Rogers and Abraham Maslow.
102. Which includes of course, issues of distribution of resources, an activity greatly assisted
by economic analysis.
103. As Rawls observes, "A theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or re-
vised if it is untrue; likewise laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must
be reformed or abolished if they are unjust." THEORY OF JUSTICE 1 (1971).
104. See Thomas Ulen, Firmly Grounded: Economics in the Future of the Law, 3 Wis. L. REV.
433, 436 (1997).
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and cannot be limited to maximizing wealth transactions. As Sir Rich-
ard Ivor notes: "there are always policy trade-offs between efficiency,
fairness and other individual and community values" with which law
must concern itself.10 5 In particular, law cannot be limited to a discus-
sion of how to organize and protect those with wealth.10 6
Some readers may object that this article is not dealing with real law
and economics scholars but a mere caricature.1 07 Consider, however,
Posner's explanation of value: "The most important thing to bear in
mind about the concept of value is that it is based on what people are
willing to pay for something rather than on the happiness they would
derive from having it."108 He goes on to explain: "The wealth of soci-
ety is the aggregate satisfaction of those preferences (the only ones
that have ethical weight in a system of wealth maximization) that are
backed up by money." 10 9 Posner's dismissal of those people without
resources not "backed up by money" as not valuing goods is difficult
to understand and morally unacceptable even by the society he pur-
ports to represent. 110 For example, recent pharmaceutical companies'
decision to supply HIV drugs at low cost because of public pressure
suggests that maximizing wealth is not a sufficient or acceptable or-
ganizing principal or value to many Americans."'
From another perspective, one may ask: Does Posner truly expect
people to believe that a starving person with no money places less
value (in any recognizable sense of the word) on a loaf of bread than a
wealthy person who happens to buy a loaf to feed the ducks? 1 2 With
a swipe of his pen Posner has discounted the concerns of 5.9 billion
people simply because they lack the dollars necessary to purchase re-
105. Ivor, supra note 13, at 1.
106. See Robert Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. OF LEGAL STUDIES 191 (1980).
107. See criticism noted by Cox. supra note 4, (his note 47 mentions caricature criticism).
108. POSNER, supra note 13, at 60. Curiously, this explanation of wealth ignores the economic
principle established by Daniel Bernoulli concerning the marginal utility of money. That princi-
ple is that the value of each additional dollar is less than the one prior.
109. Id. at 61.
110. At times, Posner suggests he and his fellow Court of Appeal judges are just ordinary folk
sharing the values of the majority of society, although he acknowledges at other times he may be
out of touch.
111. The drug industry escaped this fate when in 1995 it stopped producing eflornithine, the
cure for sleeping sickness, because of the lack of public awareness of sleeping sickness and be-
cause it does not strike people in Northern climates. It is estimated that the drug would save the
66,000 people who die of it annually. Production of the drug was restarted when pharmaceutical
companies were able to commercialize its hair loss side-effects.
112. Dworkin's criticism of Posner, noted in POSNER, supra note 13. See also, Dworkin, supra
note 106.
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sources.113 Oddly, if one were to consider the issue from a broader
perspective, these people have all the same rights, including property
rights in the environment, to such things as clean air and water that
provide an economic contribution of more than $35 trillion1 14 to the
world's productive output. It is perhaps instructive to observe that
America as the wealthiest country on the planet is also a notoriously
disproportionate, over-consumer t 15 and does not pay these 5.9 billion
poor people for the use of their property rights in the environment.
Nonetheless, Posner and his fellow law and economics scholars are
pleased to dismiss the concerns of the poor while using without pay-
ment their environmental property.
Law, however, recognizes that human nature is not only self-inter-
ested nor wealth driven in a way that economics does not and can-
not. t t6 One need look no further than the Steve Martin character in
the movie The Jerk for an example that touches legal theory and legal
practice and the economic decisions faced in both. In that movie,
Martin plays a character who became fabulously wealthy as a result of
a quirky invention. In the course of the movie, the wealthy Martin
marries, and later, as he loses his fortune, finds himself in a divorce.
As he stumbles out of his mansion weeping, he grabs a few items that
have meaning or "wealth" for him. He bawls; "All I want is this ash-
tray, my blanket and a pair of pants." The money involved simply
does not interest him.
The neo-classical positivist has difficulty explaining this action. The
lawyer acting for Martin, in order to avoid a negligence claim later
would have to advise him to consider more carefully his economic
113. Estimates of the world's population are 6.5 billion, of whom 10% live a "developed"
lifestyle-i.e. have the income necessary to support excess consumption. This problem of dis-
missing the majority has not been resolved by the New Haven Law and Economics scholars.
Despite the fact that 2/3 of the USA's wealth cannot be explained by leading economist, Paul
Krugman, Bruce Ackerman is content to argue that the real problem facing the USA is how to
distribute this awesome amount of money exclusively among Americans. BRUCE ACKERMAN &
ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY (2000).
114. Figure from world renowned scientist and ecologist, David Suzuki, in R. Cairney, Suzuki
Offers 10 steps to Save the Planet" (Jan. 10, 2003 ) EXPRESS NEWS, University of Alberta, availa-
ble at http://www.expressnews.ualberta.ca/expressnews/articles/news.cfm?pID=3646&s=A. D.
Kysar, supra note 85, at 40 (citing R. Constanza. et al., The Value of the World's Ecosystem
Services and Natural Capital, 387 NATURE 253, 259 (1997) (offering a range of $16 trillion to
$54 trillion)).
115. This is precisely the problem of public goods: over-production & over-consumption.
Other terms could be "non-valuing," or perhaps, "thieves" are better words, although to be a
thief in a legal sense, one must have property rights in the commons defined.
116. See the article by Thaler, supra note 37. Exacerbating the issue is its dogmatic application
over what is likely too wide a scope. See Hsuing, supra note 17. Other models which include a
much broader approach to human behaviour and society, such as that of Amarta Sen, are simply
not addressed.
[Vol. 2:463
THE IMPORTANCE OF CORPORATE MODELS
rights. Nevertheless, should the client Martin persist in this view, the
lawyer should not substitute her view of justice, fairness or value for
that of the client. And the law does and must take account of these
various value systems. Economics cannot.' 17 As Hart has famously
said, "law, however, is too important a thing to be left to lawyers." 11 8
Richard Rorty, America's leading philosopher, has said the same con-
cerning philosophers,1 9 and it is undoubtedly true that the value judg-
ments required for policy analysis and society's development are too
important to be left to the economists.
VII. JURISPRUDENCE AND CORPORATE LAW
Bringing the discussion back to the corporation then, it can be seen
that the economic analysis of the nexus of contracts corporation does
not take into account all of law's separate objectives such as fairness
and justice. Further it fails to include a plurality of values. Even a
modest review of current corporate law objectives in the United
States suggests that it is a plurality of values that forms the basis. Fur-
thermore, these values are not at all in coincidence with one another.
Corporate law scholar Eric Orts notes for example, the divided eco-
nomic object: profit vs. wealth, short vs. long term, central manage-
ment vs. dispersed capital providers, capital accumulation, protection
of investors, t20 and the protection of other interests 121 all as interests
within the corporation and corporate law.
Corporate law values also conflict internally as they represent dif-
ferent values in the corporation, society and competing policies. Mil-
Ion, for example, argues that corporate law has at least four norms
which extend beyond a reductionist nexus of contracts model. He
suggests that it should: (1) promote stable relations between certain
non-shareholder constituencies and the corporation, (2) adjust the
gains between shareholders and non-shareholders, (3) address the
fairness in allocation of transaction costs, and (4) look for ways to
117. For a discussion of Rational Choice Theory in Law and Economics, see Thomas Ulen,
Rational Choice and the Economic Analysis of Law, 19 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 487 (1994).
118. H.L.A. Hart, Bentham on Legal Rights, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE (2nd Se-
ries) A. B. Simpson ed. (1973) reprinted in D. Lyons ed., RIGHTs, (1979), at 146.
119. RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE (1999).
120. These conflicting values are studied empirically in Henry T.C. Hu, Risk, Time and Fiduci-
ary Principles in Corporate Investment, 38 UCLA L. REV. 277 (1994).
121. Eric W. Orts, The Complexity And Legitimacy Of Corporate Law, 50 WASH & LEE L.
REV. 1565 (1993).
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include in decision making those most directly effected by such
decisions. 22
Orts adds that following the law is itself an objective which he de-
scribes as "modest idealism,"'123 and even identifies the ethical dimen-
sion of corporate law that allows for non-economic considerations of
ethics and justice seen in instruments such as anti-takeover legisla-
tion.' 24 Following his remarkable and interesting analysis of corporate
legal theory Orts observes:
policies underlying corporate law cannot be reduced to a uni-dimen-
sional value, such as the economic objective of 'maximizing share-
holders' wealth' or even, more generally, 'economic efficiency. 125
To narrowly limit discussion and consideration of corporate law to
matters of economy and more specifically wealth maximization, there-
fore, is either an error or a political choice, 126 and if it is a political
choice, it is only correct that it be identified and debated as such. 127
122. David Millon, New Directions In Corporate Law Communitarians, Contractarians, And
The Crisis In Corporate Law, 50 WASH & LEE L.R. REV. 1373, 1388.
123. Robert Clark, Agency Costs versus Fiduciary Duties, in JOHN PRATT AND RICHARD
ZECKHAUSER EDS., PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS, 55-79 (1984) cited
in Orts, Complexity, supra note 121at 1602.
124. Orts supra note 121. This is a summary of Orts extensive arguments at 1587-1612.
125. Id. at 1612.
126. Steven Bainbridge explicitly acknowledges his debate with communitarian corporate le-
gal scholars is political. Bainbridge, supra note 2, at 857.
127. It is most certainly a right of all members of a society to participate in such a debate
regardless of their material resources. Briefly, there are at least three bases for acknowledging
such rights. First society's members have this right at least to the extent that they live in a
democracy. Inexplicably some scholars attempt to hide their politics under the cloak of objec-
tive science. This approach is particularly inappropriate where this pseudo-science is translated
into public policy and into orthodox business management studies and fed to executives and
business students as truth. See for example, business scholar, Michael Jensen. Although Jensen
has been vocal in his political leanings in earlier works such as supra note 94, where he uncriti-
cally advocates certain views as apolitical truth, he seems to have dropped any mention of his
views and presents his later work, although still, one assumes, informed by the same political
views as objective management science. Jensen supra note 92. Second, humans rarely occupy
material resources for more than eighty years. After that time material resources are passed on,
dispersed, lost, disposed of, or disintegrate. By way of contrast, the social decisions we make as
a society have wide ranging, long-lasting and significant consequences, not only in our lifetimes
but lifetimes after our own and indeed may affect the very possibility of life on the planet.
Finally, the nature of the discussion must address the public property versus private property
debate. At what point, if any, should individuals who control of vast amounts of resources and
vast groups of people be regulated by the public? The issue of public and private is addressed
considerably in the literature under the rubric of stakeholder modeling. See also Cox supra note
4, Gregory Mark, The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1441 (1987); James Gordley, The Moral Foundations of Private Law, 47 AM. J. JURIS.
1(2002).
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From these political debates, appropriate models can and should be
developed, which is certainly one of the roles of models.' 28
In order to recognize the important role of models and how they
influence both legal thinking and policy making it is necessary to ex-
amine briefly the nature of models. We now turn to such an
examination.
VIII. MODELS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 1 2 9
Models have an important part to play in understanding, 130 whether
attempting to understand oneself,131 one's community, 32 or the uni-
verse itself.133 Generally, models are miniature or simplified repre-
sentations of structures, systems, or processes. 134 They provide insight
about how things may work, and provide a platform from which it is
possible to gain deeper insights and make better predictions, projec-
tions and suggestions about how things may work in the future, in-
cluding very importantly, how modifications to structures, systems or
processes may effect their future working. 135 The first, informative
function of models is sometimes described as "descriptive model-
ling."'1 36 It is particularly useful in natural sciences where descriptive
models help explain natural phenomena and permit us to understand
128. This is certainly the case in politics even more than in science. See P. Feyerabend's work
on modelling and theory in his work on the philosophy of science. P. FEYERABEND, AGAINST
METHOD (1975).
129. Although I have chosen to analyze this debate from the perspective of the Philosophy of
Science, I wish to draw the reader's attention to an insightful article by Thomas Joo from the
perspective of Cognitive Science and Literary Heuristics in Joo supra note 31. Joo suggests that
the corporation as a nexus of contracts-i.e. the metaphor of the Firm-is of limited applicability
and therefore limited validity in explicating the nature of the corporation. His recommendation
of improving the metaphor by considering the property aspects of the corporation deserves
serious discussion. An alternative view is taken by Paul Cox who writes "clashing political
moralities are imperfectly modeled as a confrontation between 'communitarianism' and the
neoclassical economic analysis of the firm" in Cox, supra note 4 at 396.
130. As a curious note, models are not likely exclusive to humans. Psychologist Edward Chace
Tolman studying rat abilities in navigating labyrinths, suggested that they create a "cognitive
map" or model in order to navigate successfully. E. Tolman, Cognitive Maps in Rats and Men 55
PSYCH. REV. 189-208 (1948).
131. Models in psychology.
132. Models in social sciences.
133. Models in physical sciences and religion.
134. See section "Model history is culture history" in Dr. Mueller "The Concept of Model and
the Quadruple History of 'Modulu"', opening lecture of the 13th International Conference on
History and the Philosophy of Science, Univ. of Zurich, 19-22 Oct., 2000 on Scientific Models:
Their Historical and Philosophical Relevance.
135. See for an extended discussion, M. MORGAN AND M. MORRISON EDS. MODELS AS
MEDIATORS: PERSPECTIVES ON NATURAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (1999).
136. See Braybrooke, chapter "Causal Regularities on the Naturalistic Side" in BRAYBROOK,
supra note 89 at 20-46.
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causal connections between such phenomena. In the social sciences,
this is the more conservative approach to the scientific endeavour. 137
The second function of modelling is denominated "prescriptive"
modelling.138 This type of modelling does not provide the strong
causal connection found in the physical sciences. Rather, it provides
mere probability in terms of correlational relevance. 139 That is, it does
not provide information that x causes y. Instead, it provides informa-
tion that in the presence of x there is a high likelihood of the presence
of y. Despite not being able to provide causal explanations, this type
of modelling provides valuable insight and guidance in terms of for-
ward research and broader guidance.
Modelling, however useful as a heuristic device, like all human en-
deavours is value laden, or as discussed by philosophers of science,
such as Lacan, "theory-laden." This phenomenon-sometimes re-
ferred to as the hermeneutical circle140--refers to the cyclical develop-
ment as each understanding is being built upon the previous
understandings, each one supposedly advancing upon the previous un-
derstanding, but obviously, to some extent at least guided by the
presuppositions, and limitations of the underlying theory. 141
Model theory is important because it reveals the restrictions and
perspectives that models impose. 142 Consider the restrictions models
have imposed historically. When one uses a spiritual model of human
beings, illness is the result of demon possession or punishment for
moral or spiritual failing. When one uses a biological model that same
illness becomes a matter of bacterial or viral infection, or chemical
imbalance or other disease. Even a less dramatic change of models
within a single discipline can have a dramatic outcome. For example,
137. See Braybrooke's chapters "Three Sides of Social Science" and "Settled Social Rules on
the Interpretive Side" in, Id. at 1-19 and 47-67 respectively.
138. See Braybrooke on Social Science Interpretive methods, id.
139. Advances in correlational sciences have been greatly advanced by progress in statistical
theory and calculation. See e.g., WESLEY SALMON, STATISTICAL EXPLANATION AND STATISTI-
CAL RELEVANCE (1970).
140. See e.g., the post-Heideggerian hermeneutics tradition as carried on by H. GADAMER,
TRUTH AND METHOD, TRANS. BY J. WEINSHEIMER, AND D. MARSHALL, (1983) or furthered in
post-Marxian critical thought as represented in Jurgen Habermas' work such as HABERMAS,
JURGEN THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE AcrION, 2 VOLS., TRANS. T. MCCARTHY, (1989).
141. Essentially, Feyerabend's critique of scientific method. See FEYERABEND, supra note
128.
142. Although model theory was central to the debates of the philosophy of science from
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS (1921), RUDOLF CARNAP, PHILOS-
OPHY AND LOGICAL SYNTAX (1935) the term was coined by A. TARSKI, LOGIC, SEMANTICS,
META-MATHEMATICS, (1954/55) and has subsequently formed the basis for much subsequent
advance in the study and understanding of scientific method. Cited in Mueller supra note 134.
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changing models had a dramatic impact on medicine in the case of a
formerly fatal illness known as "childbed fever."
Women in the nineteenth century who gave birth often died from
the associated illness, "childbed fever. ' 143 The Hungarian obstetrician
and researcher, Ignaz Semmelweis, observed that women in the Ma-
ternity Hospital in Vienna had a higher mortality rate from "childbed
fever" than other women in neighbouring clinics, or at home. The
model in vogue at the hospital and in the medical community at large
suggested that the fever was the result of stale air. As a result of this
model, a concerted effort was made by the hospital and medical staff
to avoid exposing new mothers to stale air and instead, new mothers
were given special access to air from the outdoors.
Semmelweis began to look for other explanations, however, after
his male colleague Kolletschka fell ill and died. Kolletschka, who had
cut himself in the process of an autopsy he had performed on a
woman who had died of childbed fever, died shortly thereafter having
succumbed himself to the same symptoms which were diagnosed as
caused by childbed fever. Semmelweis, the alert researcher, discarded
the stale air model, made the connection between the cut and the ill-
ness, which in addition to radically decreasing the deaths from child-
bed fever, led to the discovery of germs. Had Semmelweis been so
committed to his model that contradictory information could not in-
terfere, germs would not have been discovered possibly for several
decades.144
As this example illustrates, the theory laden nature of the model
adopted can have significant impact on what is found. In particular,
how scientists deal with phenomena inconsistent with the model can
be determinative not only of current findings, but also of future pro-
gress, the allocation of resources, to research programs 145 or tradi-
tions146  and as a result, the overall direction of the scientific
endeavour.147
143. Account taken from WILLIAM BECHTEL, PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE: AN OVERVIEW FOR
COGNITIVE SCIENCE (1988). See the first hand account in IGNAZ SEMMELWEIS, THE ETIOLOGY,
CONCEPT AND PROPHYLAXIS OF CHILDBED FEVER, MEDICINE: A TREASURY OF ART AND
LITERATURE 136 (1991) (K. Codell Carter ed., trans., The Univ of Wisc. Press 1983).
144. Kuhn in his discussion of "normal science" contra Popper's suggestion that when falsi-
fied, a hypothesis can survive if the secondary premises of the hypothesis is discarded and the
principle premise kept. See Kuhn and Popper in IMRE LAKATOS, & ALAN MUSGRAVE, EDS.
CRITICISM AND GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE (1970).
145. Id.
146. LARRY LAUDAN, PROGRESS AND ITS PROBLEMS (1977); Larry Laudan, A Problem-Solv-
ing Approach to Scientific Progress, in IAN HACKING (ED.), SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1987).
147. For an interesting, applied discussion of the role of science-whether it is primarily for
the discovery of nature's secrets or the domination and exploitation of nature-see Australian
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The celebrated philosopher of science, Thomas Kuhn argues that
there are three manners or strategies in science for dealing with the
problem resulting from model failure.148 Where phenomena are ob-
served that cannot be explained by the model, they can be ignored,
used to modify the model, or where the phenomena is too far from the
model's descriptive or predictive ability, the model can be discarded
and a new model developed.1 49 When a model is beginning to fail the
entrenched defenders of the model, who continue to control the
power and resources of the discipline-including research funding,
faculty positions, and journals15 0-defend their model at times vi-
ciously against the researchers finding contradicting phenomena
which undermines the model. The entrenched defenders make efforts
to stifle the dissenting researchers' voices. 151
A critical problem arising from stifling opposing views, as identified
by Feyerabend, is that we cannot know what the future will discover
and count or value as knowledge, and accordingly, following a domi-
nant model too strictly may retard the advancement of knowledge in-
stead of advancing it.152 All knowledge is founded upon cultural
assumptions, and these assumptions are value laden. 153 Feyerabend, a
renowned philosopher of science confronted this profoundly first
hand while teaching at UC Berkley. He wrote of his experience:
My function was to carry out the educational policies of the State of
California which means I had to teach people what a small group of
white intellectuals had decided was knowledge. . . In the years
1964ff. Mexicans, Blacks, Indians entered the university as a result
of new educational policies. There they sat, partly curious, partly
economist, and former Governor of the Australian Reserve Bank, H.C. COOMBS, THE RETURN
OF SCARCITY: STRATEGIES FOR AN ECONOMIC FUTURE, Science and Technology-For What pur-
pose? 61-82 (1990).
148. KUHN, supra note 31.
149. Kuhn's seminal work challenging traditional notions of the rational progress of science by
model advancement, sets out a theory based on an analysis of the actual development by a
review of historical scientific discoveries. Kuhn suggests a five phase development of science: 1)
immature science, 2) normal science, 3) crisis, 4) revolution and 5) resolution. See Kuhn, supra
note 31.
150. See e.g., Laudan supra note 144; BRAYBROOKE, supra note 89, at 77-78 (discussing Pierre
Bourdieu, The Specificity of the Scientific Field and the Social Conditions of the Progress of Rea-
son, SOCIAL SCIENCE INFORMATION 19-47(1975) (discussing Imre Lakatos, Falsification and the
methodology of Scientific Research Programs, IN LAKATOS supra note 144)).
151. Kuhn, supra note 31. An interesting example of this opposition occurred in the case of
economist, Tibor Scitovsky. Scitovsky was interested in examining and weighing families of pref-
erences. His efforts to do so were challenged, research resources were denied and other efforts
were made to thwart him. THE JOYLESS ECONOMY: An inquiry into human satisfaction and
consumer dissatisfaction (1976).
152. See e.g., FEYERABEND, supra note 128.
153. This is Lakatos' idea in his discussion of Theory-laden models.
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disdainful, partly simply confused hoping to get an 'education'.
What an opportunity for a prophet in search of a following! What
an opportunity, my rationalist friends told me, to contribute to the
spreading of reason and the improvement of mankind! I felt very
differently. For it dawned on me that the intricate arguments and
the wonderful stories I had so far told to my more or less sophisti-
cated audience might just be dreams, reflections of the conceit of a
small group who had succeeded in enslaving everyone else with
their ideas. Who was I to tell these people what and how to think.154
Feyerabend's insight is stunning, particularly in its blunt, critical, and
open presentation of his perception of the situation. It is a realization
that became a call for much of the academy, and as a result many
disciplines have moved from stark rationalism still advanced by neo-
classicists into the post-moderism Feyerabend confronted in this
period.
Despite this realization among the philosophers of science and
many scientists, for many economists, understanding of the role of
modelling in science is at best weak.1 55 Friedman for example, wrote:
"Important and significant hypotheses will be found to have 'assump-
tions' that are wildly inaccurate descriptive representations of reality
"156 One cannot help but find it a bit discomforting to have major
policy issues concerning the economy and development of society de-
termined on quasi-scientific models we know to be "wildly inaccu-
rate. '157 As another example, the positivist Posner, confusing model
and theory, states "A model can be a useful tool of discovery even if it
is unrealistic... even though its basic premise was false. . . We should
be pragmatic about theory.' 1 58 Posner is fundamentally, methodolog-
ically wrong. 159 Scientific theory is not about pragmatism. 60 It is
154. SCIENCE IN A FREE SOCIETY (1978).
155. See e.g., Richard Rorty's discussion of Nobel Laureate in Physics, Steven Weinberg, in his
"Thomas Kuhn, Rocks and the Laws of Physics" 6 COMMON KNOWLEDGE 1 (1997), reprinted in
R. RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE 175 (1999).
156. Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECO.
NOMICS 23, 30 (1985).
157. HAUSAMN, supra note 6, at 163-168, notes that the accuracy of assumptions is critical in
developing well functioning models with particular reference to Friedman's methodology.
158. Richard Posner, The New Institutional Economics Meets Law and Economics, 149 J. OF
INSTrruTIoNAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, 77 (1993).
159. See Hausman's discussion. His position concerning Friedman is more moderate than
that presented here. HAUSAMN, supra note 6, at 163-68.
160. Posner's inability to put together a credible theory of pragmatism or ethics is skillfully
demonstrated by Robert Dworkin in the latter's review of Posner's works RICHARD POSNER,
THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (2000) and RICHARD POSNER, AN AFFAIR
OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON (2000).
Dworkin's critique can be found in Philosophy & Monica Lewinsky, 47(4) New York Review of
Books, 9 Mar., 2000
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about understanding reality,1 6' about getting it right.' 62 The extreme
views on economics, and law and economics, embraced by positivists
Friedman and Posner demonstrate an incorrect understanding of the
nature of modelling despite its centrality to scientific enquiry.' 63
While the internecine battling between academics may, with reason,
seem trivial to those outside the academy, the implications of model-
ling do not stop on the steps of the academy. Where those competing
models have an impact on policy and as a result, on society, and even
on the planet as a whole, modelling and the scientific process take on
a gravity that extends well beyond the academy, even to the most re-
mote corners of the globe.' 64 Where, for example, a country adopts a
particular economic model, which carries its value assumption of
"economy above all", increased global warming inducing carbon-diox-
ide emissions which benefit the economy are considered the better
choice. 165 Such is the economic modelling debate, 166 of which corpo-
rate modelling is a very important expression.
As we have seen, there are various value or "theory-laden" aspects
to the model discussion and these apply no less to the model devel-
oped in law. 167 A fundamental analysis of legal scholars' prior philo-
161. This is not an adoption of essentialism. Rather, by reality I mean the generally accepted
phenomena under study by a group of scientists.
162. Interestingly, jurist F. Hallis adopted a similar view of models in "juridical science." Hal-
lis offered: "[I]f therefore juristic concepts are not true universals, they are not pure fictions
which have not relation to the true account of the real facts .... [lit is a sufficient answer to
those who say that juristic science is not concerned with the real nature of social facts, but only
with what the lawyer makes of them, to point out that the law has a practical and not a utopian
aim." Mark, supra note 127, at 1470 (citing FREDERICK HALLIS, CORPORATE PERSONALITY XVi,
xli (1930)).
163. See Daniel M. Hausman's critique of economists understanding or acceptance of scien-
tific method in Philosophy of Economics, in ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, Vol.
3, 211-22.
164. The effects of global warming are being seen, for example, in the isolated communities of
the Canadian Artic. Mush at the North Pole in the NY Times T. Friedman in Alaska. See the
most recent spate of lawsuits against corporations discussed in A Novel Tactic on Warming, N.Y.
TIMES, July 28, 2004.
165. G.W. Bush stated USA environmental policy in just these terms. In explaining why he
rejected Kyoto he stated: "I will not accept anything that will harm our economy or hurt our
American workers." "Bush says Kyoto could harm American economy" March 29, 2001 Cana-
dian Broadcasting Corporation.
While it may be argued that climate change may hurt the economy more than polluting will
benefit it, because of the economic model used by the Bush Administration, the economic harm
is apparently not factored in.
166. In his famous lections on the Industrial Revolution, renowned historian A. Toynbee dis-
cussed the economic modelling debate as "Economic Science, and its antithesis, Socialism", LEC-
TURES ON THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN ENGLAND (1884), reprinted as TOYNBEE, A. THE
INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 58 (1956), cited in J. COHEN, REVOLUTION IN SCIENCE 267 (1985).
167. By situating this discussion of legal models after a discussion of scientific models, I am
not implying that law is a science.
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sophical and political commitments has been conducted by Professor
Cox. t 68 As Cox puts it:
Resolution of conflicting normative visions through law conceived
as a political process or dialogue, or as the practical wisdom of legal
authority is not a resolution compelled by the norms of our commu-
nity. Rather, it is a choice of one tradition over another. That choice
is not itself justified by reference to the tradition chosen; it is merely
explained by reference to the chooser's prior commitment to that
tradition.169
These prior commitments address the role of the state, the nature of
the individual, and the nature of society. t70 Briefly, for legal scholars,
political and philosophical issues identified by Cox are threefold: (1) is
the state an inefficient Leviathan of whom we should be sceptical, or
is its role to create and mold a better, more humane, more just soci-
ety? (2) Is the individual a rational self-interest maximizer, or a social
being, such as a social constructionists suggest,'171 bound by the norms
of society? And finally, (3) is society a cooperative measure for the
good of all, or is it a mere means for individuals to achieve individual
ends?172
The debate framed as such, with its politics made explicit, becomes
potentially one in which the corporation and corporate law become
important constituents in the larger enterprise of the understanding
and shaping of human society and individuals. This debate requires
fundamental value judgments concerning, among other things, the val-
uing of solidarity173 over efficiency 174 or vice-versa, such things as
whose planet the Earth is, and whose interests count, or be ignored.
Wisdom in handling models would require one to note Wittgenstein's
observation: "Say what you choose, so long as it does not prevent you
from seeing the facts (And when you have seen them, there is a good
deal you will not say.)" 175
As previously noted, models are of two types: descriptive and pre-
scriptive. The debate about models in corporate law has been re-
stricted to the former: it has been a debate about what model best fits
the corporation as we have it today in society. From this perspective,
the contractarians would appear to be correct as far as they go if one
168. Cox, supra note 4.
169. Id. at 513.
170. The framing of the issues as set in this paragraph is based on Cox's article, is but in no
way does justice to the careful and very sophisticated analysis offered by Professor Cox.
171. See Cox, supra note 4.
172. A necessary corollary to the view that there is no such thing as society.
173. Communitarian or Progressive Corporate law scholars.
174. Contractarian Corporate law scholars.
175. LUDWIG WI-1GENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 79 (3rd ed. 1968).
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agrees to ignore parties whose interests they have chosen not to
acknowledge.176
The other type of model, the prescriptive, is important in the discus-
sions about law, economics, society and social policy. Society takes
note of, adapts to and models itself after the prescriptive model. As a
result, prescriptive models often do become descriptive models.177 It
is in this context, that the question of: "What is the corporation?" is
transformed into: "What should the corporation become?" As a result
the modelling debate comes into renewed focus. It is at this point that
the discussion becomes very interesting and the difference between
law and economics comes into even sharper contrast.
IX. TRENDS AND CRITIQUES - STAKEHOLDERS
AND SHAREHOLDERS
In North America from the 1930's until the 1970's, the model for
the corporation was the communitarian model in which the corpora-
tion had some social responsibilities. This model was obtained as a
result of the Berle and Means debate "Whom should the corporation
serve?" 178 which was one result of the economic collapse and Great
Depression of the 1930's. The model springs from a broader view of
the business corporation and recognizes that in addition to sharehold-
ers, other interests, such as those of employees, suppliers and commu-
nities are legitimate concerns for corporate executives.1 79
As politics under Ronald Reagan moved in a more conservative di-
rection, however, the corporate legislation followed.' 80 Neo-classical
economists' prescriptive model for the corporation, was followed and
the move from communitarian to contractarian model commenced. 18'
This focus on wealth generation to the exclusion of all other concerns
has been most directly advocated by the Chicago School of which
Milton Friedman is a leading spokesperson. In his famous dictum
quoted previously, the role of corporate managers is "to make as
176. Steven Bainbridge's article is perhaps the best analysis of this aspect of the contractarian-
communitarian debate. Bainbridge, supra note 2.
177. Heuristic and hermeneutical aspects of the model have been discussed above.
178. For a review of the debate, see A. A. Sommer, Whom Should the Corporation Serve? The
Berle-Dodd Debate Revisited Sixty Years Later 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33 (1991). For a review of
the history of these models see William Bratton, The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical
Perspectives from History, 1 STANFORD LAW REV. 1471-527 (1989), in SALLY WHEELER ED., THE
LAW OF THE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: SELECTED ESSAYS, OXFORD READINGS IN SOCIO-LEGAL
STUDIES 117-179 (1994).
179. For a discussion of the models and the thinking underlying each, see Sheehy, supra note
96.
180. L. MCQuAIG, ALL YOU CAN EAT 33-39 (2001).
181. See Bratton, supra note 179.
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much money for their stockholders as possible."' 82 Further, Friedman
stated that all calls for corporate social responsibility should be ig-
nored as pernicious and a threat to freedom. 183 It is important to note
that the supposedly value free scientist-economist is advocating partic-
ular economic policies on the basis of his philosophical values. Appar-
ently, it is appropriate even from an economist's perspective to
inquire about values and in particular which values we wish to pursue
as a society, in this case freedom. Interestingly, he does not explain
why investors' freedom to invest the excess funds they have available
for investment is more important than the poors' freedom from job
insecurity or hunger.
In another curious self-contradiction, Friedman and other wealth
maximization economists, 84 implicitly recognize that wealth is not an
end in itself. Rather, it is an intermediate end-something that leads
to another more desirable end or ultimate end.1R5 According to these
economists the overall social good is the ultimate justification for the
exclusive focus of corporations on profit. In other words, the good
end of social benefit will be achieved by ignoring it and by focusing
instead exclusively on another end-shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion.186 These economists are making an old and well known argu-
ment. 187 Their argument, sacrificing individual good for the purpose
of creating the greater social good, is the argument advanced by the
philosophical school known as utilitarianism,188 which coincidentally
collides with Friedman's other great concern of freedom. Briefly, how
does one sacrifice the individual for the common good while still pro-
tecting individual freedom as the ultimate end?
182. The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. MAG., at 32-33, 122,
124, 126 (Sept. 13, 1970).
183. Id.
184. See e.g., Jensen, "value maximization is an important one because it leads... to the max-
imisation of social welfare." Supra note 92, at 302.
185. Acknowledged even by POSNER, supra note at 108 and discussed in more detail in Cun-
ningham, supra note 58, at 164.
186. This position shows either a remarkable quasi-religious faith in free market economics or
a Zen approach to social justice. For a discussion of foundations of the stakeholder-shareholder
debate see Sheehy, supra note 96. This shareholder primacy model is usually advanced by cor-
porate law scholars who consider themselves contractarians.
187. See Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Consequentialism, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (2003); Edward N. Zalta (ed.), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
sum2003/entries/consequentialism/. Posner's acknowledgement of his "wealth maximization"
theory as a refinement of ethical utilitarianism, supra note 13.
188. Utilitarian theory is an important and helpful theory in policy development and analysis.
It is not, however, well suited to many matters of concern to lawyers. In particular, utilitarian
have struggled to address the problem that the interests of the majority may be at the expense of
minorities.
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In the law and economics field, Posner, Epstein and others have
advocated wealth maximization as the basic principal of law189 and
have encouraged legislative and judicial reforms in order to imple-
ment efficiency and wealth maximization principals. As applied in
corporate law, it supports the shareholder primacy model. 190
In summary, the economists have made two main claims about the
contractarian model of the corporation. First, they have made the ec-
onomic claim that it will lead to greater benefit of all society. Second,
they have made two philosophical or value claims: that the con-
tractarian corporation will lead to greater freedom, and following the
economists' bias in favour of material satisfaction, that it will lead to
an increased delivery of human welfare ultimately measured by
happiness. 19'
Concerning the first proposition, that increasing shareholder wealth
benefits all of society, the evidence has not borne out the economists'
prediction. As one part of the general neo-classical economic policy
prescription for the years from 1980 through to the present the con-
tractarian corporation (and other neo-classical prescriptions) has
failed to deliver a wealthier or more just society.192 For example, in
the USA, as corporations gave up a broader societal focus and turned
toward shareholder primacy, the disparity between rich and poor
grew, the wealth of the middle class declined, 193 and corporate mo-
nopolization of power increased. 194
189. POSNER, supra note 13, RICHARD EPSTEIN, PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE SOCIETY: RECON-
CILING INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY WITH THE COMMON GOOD (1998).
190. Most comprehensively put forward by EASTERBROOK, supra note 5.
191. David Blanchflower & Andrew Oswald, Money, Sex and Happiness: An Empirical Study,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 10499, (May 2004), http://
www.nber.org/papers/w10499 (last visited Jul. 30, 2004.
192. See for example, the summary of statistics of poverty and homelessness in the United
States in Bob Herbert, Change The Channel, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2003).
193. See e.g., David Cay Johnston, Very Richest's Share of Income Grew Even Bigger, Data
Show, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2003) (reporting "The 400 wealthiest taxpayers accounted for more
than 1 percent of all the income in the United States in the year 2000, more than double their
share just eight years earlier,"). Clearly, there are many reasons for such disparities such as
government policies, performance of the economy and changes in the labour force resulting
from globalization, but the disparity noted parallels the shift away from stakeholder thinking and
seems to suggest that shareholder primacy cannot be supported along these lines. See David
Millon, Frontiers of Legal Thought: Theories of the Corporation, DUKE L. J. 201, 222, 229-230
(1990) on the triumph of shareholder primacy in this era. See also, LUDWIG MCQUAIG, supra
note 181, at 96-107.
194. The landmark studies are G. DOMHOFF, WILLIAM WHO RULES AMERICA NOW? (1983),
and C. MILLS, WRIGHT POWER, POLITICS & PEOPLE: THE COLLECTED ESSAYS OF C. WRIGHT
MILLS (1963). See also, CHARLES K. DERBER, CORPORATION NATION: How CORPORATIONS
ARE TAKING OVER OUR LIVES AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT (1998). For a flavour of the
American public's skeptical opinion on corporate power even in the boom years leading up to
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Further evidence of the effect of shareholder primacy corporations
and social wealth on a wider scale comes from the World Bank and
the IMF. The structural adjustment programs imposed by these insti-
tutions, 195 an integral part of which have been to open borders to
transnational shareholder primacy corporations, have been failures. 196
The failures referred to here are policy failures, the great hardships
they have caused the poor, and the acid test, they have failed to de-
liver the economic relief for which they were designed. 197 Worse yet,
the costs of these failures have been borne by the poor while increas-
ing corporate profits.198 These outcomes would lead one to suggest
that the neo-classical corporate law model does not make for a better
society.199 Simply, their first claim of leading to a greater benefit for
all society is unsubstantiated.
The neo-classicist is likely to reply that this conclusion is erroneous
as the issue of distribution of benefits is misplaced as a matter of cor-
porate law. Indeed, it cannot be assumed that a consensus exists con-
cerning the equitable distribution of goods. Some will argue that the
distribution of resources is irrelevant to the organization of society
provided one can justify the status quo.200 Others will argue that a
just society requires consideration and some adjustment of the distri-
bution of society's benefits.20 1 Yet others argue that absent transac-
the 2001 stock market bubble burst, see the article, Too Much Corporate Power?, Bus. WEEK,
(Sept. 11, 2000), available at http://www.businessweek.com/2000/00_37/b3698001.htm.
195. W. Easterly, The Effect of IMF and World Bank Programs on Poverty (2000), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/staffp/2000/00-00/e.pdf. See also Noble Prize Laureate and
former chief economist at the World Bank JOSEPH STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCON-
TENTS (2001) and more recently, C. Welch, The Broken Promise of NAFT, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6,
2004) available at http://www.foreignpolicy-infocus.orgfbriefs/vol5/v5nl4sap.html. See also, Mc-
OUAIG, supra note 140, at 82-92.
196. This failure of the programs is the main theme of Stiglitz book. Id.
197. This is one of former World Bank Chief Economist, Joseph Stiglitz' complaints.
198. Nora Lustig, economist and former Director of the World Bank's World Development
Report and non-resident Senior Fellow at Brookings Institute observes that the poor and middle
class absorb an inordinate share of the pain of structural adjustments. See her chapter "Social
Costs" in NORA LUSTIG, MEXICO: THE REMAKING OF AN ECONOMY 61-95 (1992). See also
DINE, supra note 3, at ch. 5 and extensive notes therein. For a recent analysis see Egor Kraev
Modeling Macroeconomic and Distributional Impacts of Stabilization and Adjustment Packages:
Current Literature and Challenges, CEPA Working Paper 2003-06 (2003 ). available at http://
www.newschool.edu/cepa/papers/abstract.htm#200306.
199. A better society in the argument here may be equated with a society which has increased
either wealth or happiness. Interestingly, the wealthiest society in the world is far from the
happiest. See David Blanchflower & Alan Oswald, Money, Sex and Happiness: An Empirical
Study, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 10499 (May 2004), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w10499 (last visited Jul. 30, 2004).
200. See e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974).
201. Coase of course recognized that the real world operates with transaction costs and so that
his theorem was merely an analytical tool for wealth maximization.
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tion costs, the initial allocation of social benefits is immaterial.202 If,
however, we accept that society is for mutual benefit (and this benefit
is the neo-classicist justification for shareholder primacy corporations)
then we have the appropriate criteria to make a judgment. That judg-
ment would appear to be that the overall economic benefits supposed
to come from this prescriptive corporate law shareholder primacy
model have simply not appeared.
As to the neo-classicists' second claim concerning the values of in-
creased freedom, and delivering the ultimate good of happiness, again
the neo-classicist policies appear to be in error. In this same era of the
1980's to the present there has been increased pressure on workers to
work more hours and take on more responsibility without corollary
support-which by reducing costs increases returns to shareholders. It
is difficult to see how this increases either freedom or happiness of the
majority of the population, namely, the working class. The evidence
demonstrates that the shareholder primacy model has not increased
social wealth.
In the case of corporate models, it may well be argued that the con-
tractarian model is not producing the predicted results and hence its
claims for normative power are unfounded, and it should be modified
significantly or abandoned. As this model, however, is interwoven
with the values and ideology of neo-classical positivist economics, it is
not likely to be either modified or abandoned by these economists.
Indeed it is a fair and common criticism of economists that they fail to
abandon disproved models or models which regularly fail to deliver
predicted results.203
If economics is indeed a science, as it claims to be, then it must be
acknowledged that an unshakable faith in a model is a religious posi-
tion rather than a scientific one.20 4 Science and the scientist must deal
with their models in light of the evidence, rather than the reverse. 205
In the face of intransigence it is incumbent on other scholars party to
the debate to increase pressure to bring about a change.
202. These thinkers would be neo-classical economists following Coase.
203. Hausman comments on this counter factuality and economists difficulty in dealing with it
in his chapter "On dogmatism in economics: the case of preference reversals," in HAUSMAN,
supra note 6. Again, it is the same phenomena that seems to frustrate Stiglitz who refers to these
neo-classicists as "market fundamentalists." Stiglitz, supra note 196, at 14.
204. John Kenneth Galbraith views the changes in his opinion in this light. Stephen P. Dunn,
"The Origins of the Galbraithian System: J.K. Galbraith" interview with J.K. Galbraith, 2001.10
Division of Economics at Staffordshire University Business School, available at http://
www.staffs.ac.uk/schools/business/economics/papers/ec200l-10/pdf.
205. This is indeed Coase's point in the discussion above.
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Still, economists are correct as far as they go-that society is for
improved material benefit.206 Social contractarians have made this ar-
gument in various forms for centuries. 20 7 Economists, however, fail to
go far enough. As Rawls pointed out nearly thirty years ago, the sec-
ond pillar of the social contract is justice in economy. 208
Economics, as some economists readily acknowledge, 20 9 does not
hold all the answers and legal scholars should not be seduced into
following that lead too quickly or unquestioningly.21 0 As Orts in his
detailed analysis of normative corporate law observes, "Corporate
law, like most law, is primarily about the rule-oriented structuring of
social power, and it is specifically about the rules that structure the
organization of economic power. '211 Following Rawls, therefore, a
compelling argument can be made that corporate law should include
access to power by non-shareholders. 212
As a start, therefore, legal scholars should be developing a model
that enhances access to economic power for more parties. Friedman's
and other neo-liberal economists' dislike of intrusions on "free-
dom" 213 cannot be restricted to preserving freedom for those wealthy
and powerful enough to afford it. Hardly anyone would be willing to
see a return to the pre-suffragette or pre-emancipation USA.2 14 Yet
the contractarian model is just that-a regressive concentration of
power and wealth in the hands of the few under the guise of freedom.
This issue is certainly an issue of modelling.
Just as the economists at the World Bank are asking themselves,
what then is the alternative model for development loans and govern-
206. Rawls argues this as his first principle of social organization. But this is a modem, west-
ern view. Conflicting views are presented in a broad historical context in JARED DIAMOND,
GERMS, GUNS, AND STEEL: THE FATE OF HUMAN SOCIETY (1996).
207. Philosophers of highly divergent views have made the Social Contract argument from
John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau, to the present day John Rawls.
208. Rawls, supra note 103, at 4 and discussed in detail at 60-75, and 90-95.
209. Discussed in Hsuing, supra note 17, at 187 n.2.
210. Some economists plainly admit the fundamental role of values in their studies. See e.g., J.
Wolfenden, Homo economicusI: Fantastics Fact or Factual Fantasy?, 1(2) ETnos-A JOURNAL
OF GLOBAL ETHICS (1998) (citing LIPSEY & CHRYSTAL, AN INTRODUCTION TO PosITvE Eco-
NOMICS 28, 8TH ED.).
211. Orts, supra note 121, at 1577.
212. See the suggestion by Shun Wilson Leung, The Inadequacy Of Shareholder Primacy: A
Proposed Corporate Regime That Recognizes Non-Shareholder Interests, 30(4) COLUMBIA J.
LAW AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS 587 (1997).
213. Flexibility in approaches to problems is indeed Coase's point in the discussion above.
For example of an alarmist, libertarian appeal supporting shareholder primacy see, Jensen, supra
note 94.
214. Michael Parenti, A Constitution for the Few (1988). In particular, see excerpt in T. SI-
MON, LAW & PHILOSOPHY 172-177 (2003). See also Cunningham, supra note 58 (discussing the
economics of slavery).
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ment restructuring,215 legal scholars need to be examining more care-
fully alternative models for corporations that both enhance social
justice and economic needs.216 Legal scholars should be asking impor-
tant questions such as what objective should a new prescriptive model
include? And then, of course, look at developing new models that
would more effectively include those objectives. For legal scholars to
adhere to the shareholder primacy or contractarian corporation model
is a breach of professional responsibility. Lawyers and legal scholars
must be concerned with issues of ethics and justice. As noted at the
outset of this paper, it is not sufficient to take Chancellor William Al-
len's previously mentioned observation that the contractarian model
of the corporation is "the dominant legal academic view"'217 and end
the discussion. Describing what is cannot be the same as saying what
should be.
Other models that have done somewhat better in terms of achieving
better social ends are those found in Europe, and in particular Ger-
many, and in Japan. 218 The models followed in those countries have
included other interests such as labour and collaborating companies.
X. CORPORATE MODELS FOR THE FUTURE
Regardless of one's political and philosophical commitments it is
evident that corporations, with their concentrations of wealth and re-
sources, and as the major source of employment, are the major drivers
and controllers of the economy, culture, and environment. Joseph
Stiglitz, former World Bank Chief Economist, and Nobel Prize in Eco-
nomics winner explains that the importance of decisions about market
models can hardly be overstated.2 19 By their association and critical
role in market making and domination in the market, the importance
of corporate models is hard to overstate. Not only will they have con-
215. Possibly, new answers could arise if the science of economics is at another point of
revolution. Cohen, citing John Hicks notes various revolutions in the science of economics, in-
cluding a current movement away from Keynesian economics. Cohen, supra note 131, at 558-
559. From J. Hicks, 'Revolutions' in Economics, in LATSIS, SPIRO ED. METHOD AND APPRAISAL
IN ECONOMICS 207 (1976).
216. These are not necessarily conflicting norms. See e.g., JAN HOGENDORN, Economic Devel-
opment, 3rd ed. (1996).
217. See Allen, supra note 7.
218. As distasteful as it may be to some market economists, it must be recognized that China's
communist centrally controlled economy has been credited with saving millions from starvation
which would otherwise have arisen under capitalist market conditions. This is not to say that
China has not also caused famine and suffering among its people. See, for example, the discus-
sion in Vaclav Smil, China's Great Famine: 40 years Later-Education and Debate (Dec, 18,
1998), available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-mO999/is-7225_319/ai_58614609.
BRITISH MED. J. observes the political causes of China's previous great famine.
219. STIGLITZ, supra note 196, at 217.
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siderable bearing on the overall economy but also on the development
of societies throughout the world. They have great power to influence
such important things as global warming, 220 wilderness preserva-
tion, 221 and even warfare. 222 Before considering what models should
be considered for the future, a very modest review of contemporary
models and their respective strengths and weakness may serve as a
springboard for moving our thinking forward. In this section, I do not
intend to conduct the standard review of models of corporate govern-
ance, which Australian corporate law scholar, John Farrar, notes as a
comparative approach in the 1980's.223 I am interested instead in the
different models as they address other matters, such as social costs.
That discussion will be followed by a brief review of two management
scholars' views of future corporations and the significance of those
ideas for future corporate law development.
A. Anglo-American Model
The distinctive aspect of Anglo-American model is its "shareholder
primacy." Shareholder primacy places the interests of the shareholder
above all others, and as we have seen even to the exclusion of all other
interests.224 Other interests which are ignored include such things as
the social costs, 225 environmental costs, and employee needs. Every
cost the Anglo-American corporation can avoid, it does avoid in order
to return more money to the shareholders. Every benefit it can ap-
propriate, it does without regard to ensuring "there is enough, and as
good left in common for others. '226
220. One can examine, for example, the lobby efforts of the automotive and petroleum indus-
try against reduction in greenhouse gas-emission legislative proposals.
221. See the controversy surrounding the Bush administration's proposal to explore in the
Artic Reserve.
222. The author is referring to the infamous military-industrial complex.
223. John H. Farrar, In Pursuit of an Appropriate Theoretical Perspective and Methodology for
Comparative Corporate Governance. 13 AUST. J. OF CORP. LAW 1, 9 (2001).
224. Merton Miller, Is American Corporate Governance Fatally Flawed? chapter in DONALD
CHEW ED., STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE FINANCE AND GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS: A
COMPARISON OF THE US., JAPAN, AND EUROPE 38 (1997).
225. Social costs include things as harm to consumers, and "social capital" discussed for exam-
ple, in Paldam, Social capital: One or many? Definition and measurement, 14(5) J. OF ECONOMIC
SURVEYS, 629-653 and in M. Fafchamps & B. Minten, Returns to Social Network Capital Among
Traders, OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS 54, 173-206 (2002).
226. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT, ch. 5. para 26. Locke's theories form
the underpinning of the neo-classical economists' view of private property.
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1. Benefits of the Anglo-American Model
This model is very attractive to many for a number of reasons.
First, it is attractive because it is familiar. Second, it is attractive be-
cause it puts a considerable amount of money into the hands of share-
holders in a short amount of time.22 7 Thirdly, when the economy is
growing well, the share values of these companies increase rapidly. 228
Finally, its advocates a claim that it is the most efficient, although that
claim is contested by none less than America's foremost corporate law
scholar, John Coffee Jr.229 As noted, however, each model has not
only strengths but also particular weaknesses.
2. Weaknesses of the Anglo-American Model
One problem of the Anglo-American model is that it causes a short-
term focus. The corporation's executives are more concerned about
quarterly results and daily stock prices than the long term viability of
the corporation. Not only may this short term executive focus be tied
to corporate scandals, 230 it also causes serious under-investment in
capital expenditures that in turn undermine the long-term viability of
the corporation.231 Such companies are vulnerable to becoming out-
moded and to collapse, which in turn causes serious economic and
social consequences.2 32 Most Anglo societies are able to deal with
such collapses including corporate funded pension collapses,233 be-
cause their economies are sufficiently robust and they have adequate
social security systems; 234 however, given the demographic changes
227. Steven Kaplan, Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance: A Comparison of
Germany, Japan and the U.S., chapter in Chew supra, note 225, at 253.
228. Kaplan's numerous studies are summarized in this chapter and he finds little difference
except in terms of use of cash. Id. at 251-257.
229. John C. Coffee, et al., The Direction of Corporate Law: The Scholars Perspective, 25 DEL.
J. CORP. LAW, 79, 93 (2000).
230. Krugman has referred to this as the lesson of the recent scandals, that we cannot bribe
corporate officials to do their jobs. Paul Krugman has observed that options have been an im-
portant motivator in stock price manipulation. Paul Krugman, in his article The Outrage Con-
straint, NY TIMES. (Aug. 23, 2002), opines, "now it's clear that options were a big motivator for
corporate fraud," in his Op-Ed piece, Enron and the System N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2004).
231. Michael E. Porter, Capital Disadvantage: America's Falling Capital Investment System.
HARVARD Bus. REV. (Sept.-Oct. 1992).
232. The cost of the Enron debacle, for example, was in excess of $35 billion.
233. M. Walsh, Failed Pensions: A Painful Lesson in Assumptions, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12, 2003).
234. Stiglitz notes this peculiarity of governments in developed economies, supra note 196 at
55. Stiglitz also notes that the lack of social security can be responsible for social unrest. He
provides the recent examples in Indonesia, and Botswana, at 77 and 119. It should be noted,
however, that many less developed economies have better social security programs, but simply
lack the funds to put sufficient resources in them.
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and changes in fiscal policy, the strength and durability of such pro-
grams is questionable. 235
Another problem with the Anglo-American model becomes evident
when there is a broader economic downturn. As the world's foremost
management professor Peter Drucker observed: "It is a fair weather
model that works well only in times of prosperity. '236 In an economic
downturn, Anglo-American corporations lay-off promptly their em-
ployees and as a result, in a recession many people are out of work.237
This approach to economic downturns is not too damaging to the em-
ployees or to the economy, again because of the previously mentioned
social security system.
These strong social security systems help employees without jobs
continue to pay mortgages, living expenses and other costs. This abil-
ity of laid-off employees to continue their basic consumption habits is
critical to the Anglo-American economies because of their reliance on
consumers. The US economy, for example, relies on consumers for
two-thirds of its size and a great part of its activity.
Another problem arises from the Anglo-American model's ignoring
other interests, or externalizing. Interests such as environment, social
problems and employees have a cost which cannot be avoided. Al-
though not taken into consideration in the Anglo-American model
these costs must be paid in one way or another. 238 To the extent that
the Anglo-American corporation is forced to pay these costs, via the
legal system, the Anglo-American way is very expensive. The contri-
bution of legal services to the USA's economy is significant.239
Indeed, American corporations struggle under the burden of legal
costs240 to the extent that nearly every legal reform program looks at
235. See changes to unemployment in Chicago's demographic Bob Herbert "Locked Out at a
Young Age" N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2003). The extent to which this data can or should be extrapo-
lated, is of course uncertain. Nevertheless, there needs to be some attention to the issues raised
there.
236. P. Drucker, Will the corporation survive? Yes, but not as we know it, 360(8239) THE
ECONOMIST ( Sept. 15, 2001) at 16.
237. At the time of writing, the American unemployment figures suggest that 480,000 lost jobs
in the last month in response to the protracted economic downturn, and discussion concerning a
severely "jobless recover" suggest this may be more than a mere temporary problem.
238. Coase's Social Costs supra note 79, deals with those costs caught by law; where law has
not yet recognized such harms, for all economic and legal purposes, they fail to exist.
239. W. Stavropoulos, President of Dow Chemical Company, claimed that the costs of tort
claim 2.2% of the GDP of the USA. This, of course, is not much of an argument if tort law works
as it should: this is just the cost to the economy for corporate malfeasance through product
liability.
240. See e.g., Interview with Valerie P. Hans, author of Business on Trial: The Civil Jury and
Corporate Responsibility, 13:2 BIMONTHLY REVIEW OF LAW BOOKS (Mar./Apr. 2002), available
at http://www.law.suffolk.edu/faculty/ebander/indexl0-12-00.html.
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ways of making the system less costly.241 Not only is it very expensive,
but it is questionable how efficient the system is in either paying exter-
nalized costs or preventing them in the first place. Indeed, it could be
argued that many Anglo-American corporations operate with a "de-
ferred costs" approach where corporations and corporate executives
create costs-social, environmental and other costs-with the hope
that they will not be discovered and enforced through the legal system
until they have taken their profits and the shareholders have taken
their profits. Such cases include the examples of the asbestos lawsuits
that bankrupted the Johns Mansville Corporation 242 and the recently
launched employee suits for exposure to toxic chemicals while work-
ing in IBM chip manufacturing facilities,243 as well as the actions be-
hind the collapses of Enron, Worldcom and Tyco among too many
others.
In addition, it is important to note that the Anglo-American exclu-
sion of other "stakeholder" interests has led to considerable anti-cor-
porate backlash, which in part is behind the WTO and other anti-
globalization protests. 244 Anglo-American corporations are being
forced by the Corporate Social Responsibility movement to expand
their horizons and to spend money to include other concerns. The
societies living with this model see the corporation as a destructive
force in society which must be subject to a high level of regulation and
control. 245
241. S. Datta and J. Nugent have shown that for every increase of 1% in the number of law-
yers in a society, economic growth suffers between about 4% cited in COOTER, supra note 14, at
79.
242. To cite but a few of the 600,000 suits against the corporation: Adams v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 783 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1986) Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394,
Gideon v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 761 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1985), Thompson v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 714 F.2d 581 (5th Cir. 1983), Prelick v. Johns-Manville Corp., 531 F. Supp.
96 (W.D. Pa. 1982), Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Tex. 1981).
On the mass number of the suits, see Richard L. Cupp, Jr, ASBESTOS LITIGATION & TORT
LAW: TRENDS, ETHICS, & SOLUTIONS: Asbestos Litigation And Bankruptcy: A Case Study
For Ad Hoc Public Policy Limitations On Joint And Several Liability, 31 PEPP. L. REV.
203(2003). Cupp observes that as many as 3,000,000 suits may be filed in the case, and according
the right wing think tank, the RAND Corporation, supposedly the majority of people filing are
not sick. This objection to such claims is odd for two reasons: first, how is one to know whether
the litigants are or will be sick without the evidence, and second, tort claims may be for those
who suffer loss of a family member as well as being made by injured parties themselves.
243. See also Bob Herbert, Clouds in Silicone Valley, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2003).
244. Published by the Hemispheric Social Alliance. FTAA Exposed: A Citizens' Critique of
the November 2002 Draft of the Free Trade Area of the Americas. http://www.cpdcngo.org/docs/
Shantal%20documents/Partners%20Perspectives%20on%2OFTAA.doc
245. Regulation of Corporations is one important aspect of jury perspectives. See Donald E.
Vinson & David Perlut, The American Jury's View of Corporate America: It's Not A Pretty Pic-
ture, 7( 2) BRIEFLY... PERSPEcrIVES ON LEGISLATION, REGULATION, AND LITIGATION (Feb.
2003) published by National Legal Center for the Public Interest. From the opposite end of the
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Unlike enterprises in most other parts of the world, 246 the Anglo-
American model of the corporation has traditionally been a collection
of unrelated strangers who invest money together. It is run by a board
of directors who represent only the interests of shareholders and man-
agement. One of the on-going problems for participants in this model
is the constant effort to keep parties working together.247 Each party
focuses exclusively on and fights for its own, limited self-interest
above all else. It is an antagonistic, expensive model to manage. In-
deed, much research has focused on minimizing the effects of the
"agency problem"-the problem when investors and management are
distant from each other and pursuing separate, different interests. 248
Further, this animus is in part what drives the very expensive and of
questionable benefit, market for corporate control.249
3. Implications of the Anglo-American Model for Societies
There are a number of significant implications that can be drawn
from the Anglo-American model. This model may not be well suited
to economies that are not robust. A large corporate collapse in a
weaker economy can be expected to have significant repercussions
which will be felt throughout the economy and result in unmanage-
able social costs. Furthermore, in many societies, workers do not have
the benefit of a social security system. As a result, when the average
worker in such a society loses a job, it is a crisis. Furthermore, if there
is an economic downturn and workers do not have income to continue
to spend, such an economy will have greater difficulty reviving. Sim-
ply the consumption necessary to keep the economy prosperous will
not occur. Accordingly, the Anglo-American model which cuts jobs
rapidly and drastically in economic downturns is not well suited to
political spectrum, see work by such authors as DAVID KORTEN, WHEN CORPORATIONS RULE
THE WORLD.( 2ND ED. 2000).
246. Who is in charge? The Ins and Outs of Corporate Governance, THE ECONOMIST, at 15-16.
(Oct. 25, 2003).
247. This issue of agency costs which started with Berle and Means, has been carried forward
in the work of Michael Jensen, William Meckling, 0. Williamson & W. C. Kester, Governance,
Contracting, and Investment Horizons: A Look At Japan and Germany, chapter in Chew, supra
note 225, at 227.
248. Bainbridge notes that this issue is now pass6 for most law and economics scholars. See
Stephen Bainbridge, The Politics of Corporate Governance, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 671,
671-78 (1995) (reviewing MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL
ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994)).
249. C.K. Prahalad, Corporate Governance or Corporate Value added? Rethinking the Primacy
of Shareholder Value in CHEW, supra note 225, at 47-50. See also M. Mark Walker, On the
Shareholder Wealth Maximization Objective of Corporate Governance: The case of Leveraged
Recapitalizations, 22(4) MANAGERIAL FINANCE 53 (1996).
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many other economies, including possibly the United States of the
future.250
In its essence, the shareholder primacy model reflects particular
American values: neo-classical economics and neo-liberal values.2 51
There are important consequences which flow from these American
values, including increased wealth concentration, higher levels of un-
employment, and some of the problems with corporate governance
become exaggerated. Given some of the problems of the Anglo-
American model discussed, it is clear that there may be benefits to
considering other models.
B. German Model
One of the European models which may offer some interesting al-
ternatives is the German model. The German corporation is struc-
tured with a two tiered or "dual model" Board of Directors.2 52 The
executive board or "Vorstand" are management. The supervisory
board, "Aufsichtsrat" is a split board with one section of the board of
directors made up of shareholder nominated directors, and the other
section of the board, being made up of employee nominated direc-
tors.253 It is interesting to note that in contrast to the Anglo-Ameri-
can model in which all directors are nominated by the shareholders
and are professional managers, the directors nominated by German
workers are there to represent them, and although usually profession-
ally trained as economists or business scholars, they are not manag-
ers.254 This peculiar board structure is limited in its application to
corporations which have more than two thousand employees-the
"Mitbestimmungsgestz." Perhaps most interesting is that the opera-
tive executive board "Vorstand" is answerable not to the sharehold-
ers, but to the "Aufsichtsrat" or participatory supervisory board.
German corporations often invest money in training the worker
nominated directors to help them become more effective in their roles
as directors. This management training helps worker nominated di-
rectors to understand the management problems faced by the particu-
lar corporation. By investing in this training, the German
corporations are able to get the maximum benefit from the worker
250. Walsh, supra note 234.
251. See Mark's interesting intellectual history reaching from 13th century theology to the
20th century's view of the business corporation in the USA. Mark, supra note 127.
252. Gregory Alexander, Property as a Fundamental Constitutional Rights? The German Ex-
ample, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 733 (2003).
253. F. Schilling, Corporate Governance in Germany: The Move to Shareholder Value, 9(3)
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 148 (2001).
254. Id.
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nominated directors, and the workers are more effective in communi-
cating management concerns to workers and worker concerns to man-
agement. These directors work to protect workers' rights and
interests.
Finally, German corporations tend to be financed by banks-that is,
banks tend to be the major shareholders and indeed have accounted
for some 90% of all external corporate finance. 255 This shareholding
pattern will be seen to have significant effects in the management of
economic downturns.
1. Benefits of the German Model
Germany benefits from this model in two important strategic ways.
First, there is less labour unrest. Unlike the Anglo-American model
where parties are fighting against each other else in pursuit of their
own self-interests, the German model functions better because it
aligns management and worker interests in the larger, overall goal of
advancing the corporation. Indeed, although German executives see
problems with the boards, they would not wish to change it.256
The second advantage is that it puts the workers in direct touch with
the management solving at least in part, two fundamental manage-
ment problems-communication and trust. Management can under-
stand worker complaints, concerns and suggestions more directly and
easily. Workers sometimes have significant contributions to make to
management of the corporation because of their very different per-
spective and hands-on experience with operations.
German corporations, given their ability to coordinate more inter-
ests have more parties interested in the corporation's survival. As a
result, they tend to keep their investments in capital equipment up-to-
date, and have more secure long term outlooks. 257 German companies
tend to have longer strategic visions, less collapses, and are still very
appealing to investors.258
Traditionally, German corporations are family businesses. 259 The
structure discussed reflects these family values and it seems to work
well for those families. By including many more concerns German
corporations have been highly successful not only in producing top
255. JOHN SCOTT, CORPORATE BUSINESS AND CAPITALIST CLASSES, 145-146 (1997).
256. Schilling, supra, note 254, at 149.
257. Id. at 150.
258. Id.; Scott, supra note 256, at 147-149.
259. See Who is in Charge, THE ECONOMIST, supra note 196, and Scott, supra note 256, at 146-
147.
2004]
508 DEPAUL BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LAW JOURNAL
quality products, but they have been able to do so in a competitive
environment.
2. Drawbacks of the German Model
Effective use of this model requires an egalitarian view of humanity.
Whether presidents of companies or workers on the factory floor, the
view must be that humans are valuable, intelligent and willing contrib-
utors to overall group achievement. Furthermore, management
needs to have a confidence that workers have the intelligence and
goodwill to contribute. The overly simple x-y theory of organizational
behaviour has to be rejected. 260 Finally, the model requires at least a
minimal level of sophistication among workers.
C. Japanese Model
Another corporate model of interest is the Japanese model. Japa-
nese corporate law and practice is an interesting mix of German,
traditional Japanese, and American law.261 In some ways, Japanese
corporate law has drawn the best of each of the systems. It is impor-
tant to note that although Japanese corporate law was established in
1950 by the occupying US forces, to create corporate law the US has
basically translated and planted the Model Business Corporations Act
into the Japanese legal system. Thus, although at a legal level Japan
has American corporate law, Japanese corporations have largely ig-
nored the law and operated their corporations on the basis of extra-
legal norms.262 In practice, then, Japan has developed its own corpo-
rate law. 263 Since it is these norms have driven corporate development
in Japan more than the law, the relevant discussion focuses on the
model set out by the norm rather than the law.
The Japanese model has rejected Anglo-American "shareholder
primacy" model. In fact, in the Japanese model, shareholders inter-
ests are among the least important of the interests to be considered.264
260. McGregor's Theory X and Theory Y initially set out in his, DOUGLAS MCGREGOR, THE
HUMAN SIDE OF ENTERPRISE (1960).
261. Mark W. West, The Puzzling Divergence Of Corporate Law: Evidence And Explanations
From Japan And The United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 527, 538 (2001).
262. See discussion Curtis Milhaupt, Symposium Norms & Corporate Law: Creative Norm
Destruction: The Evolution of Nonlegal Rules in Japanese Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L.
REV. 2083 (2001).
263. See Id.
264. JOHN FARRAR, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND 34
(2001). The reluctance of Korean and Japanese managers to lay off employees and the resultant
benefit to the employees is noted in Stiglitz, supra note 196, at 57.
[Vol. 2:463
THE IMPORTANCE OF CORPORATE MODELS
Japanese priorities are: the corporation itself, customers, employees,
creditors and finally, shareholders.2 65
The Japanese model is based on the village system where everyone
worked together for common survival and the common good.266 Ac-
cordingly, as noted, Japanese executives have given a higher priority
to employees' interests than to shareholder interests. One example of
that priority is the Japanese corporate policy lifetime employment.2 67
While it is changing, it is interesting to note that the Japanese corpora-
tion has managed to survive in very difficult economic times. This em-
ployee priority has created significant benefits for Japanese society.
1. Benefits of the Japanese Model
What is particularly interesting about the Japanese modelled corpo-
ration is how it has buffered society from economic crisis, by address-
ing the interests excluded by the Anglo-American model. It is
interesting because Japan has experienced one of the most severe eco-
nomic declines in the history of the world with its society relatively in
tact.
Japan's economy has been in recession, if not depression, for over
ten years. 268 The Japanese economy has shrunk more in the last ten
years than the American economy did in the Great Depression of the
1930's.269 Despite this economic decline, the average Japanese worker
has been able to go on living without experiencing the devastating loss
of employment that characterized the American workers' experience
in the Depression. Unlike America which acquiesced to creating the
hobos and communities hobbled by broken families caused by the un-
employment of the Great Depression, 270 Japan has been much more
265. See Toshiba Chairman, Joichi Aoi, To Whom Does the Company Belong?: A New Man-
agement Mission for the Information Age, in Chew, supra note 225, at 247.
266. KENICHI OHMAE, THE MIND OF THE STRATEGIST 218-19 (1982). Milhaupt claims the
model is not the village but the family. There is some controversy about this view as it generally
accepted that many of the norms discussed here are post-World War II inventions. See L. Not-
tage & L. Wolff, Corporate Governance and Law Reform in Japan: From the Lost Decade to the
End of History? in R. HAAK ET AL (EDS), JAPANESE MANAGEMENT: IN SEARCH OF NEW BAL-
ANCE BETWEEN CONTINUITY AND CHANGE (Forthcoming).
267. Milhaupt supra note 263.
268. Finance and Economics: Checking the Slumpometer; Economics Focus, 362 THE ECONO-
MIST 91 (Mar. 2, 2002). At the time of writing this article, it appears that Japan's economy may
be recovering. See Nottage, supra note 267.
269. Id. Contrary view is expressed by Paul Krugman whose observes that Japan's last decade
has not been as severe, losing only in 2 of the last 10 years, and that the benefit received by the
average workers is due to government's public works projects. PAUL KRUGMAN, THE GREAT
UNRAVELING 95 (2003). See references supra note 182.
270. The American experience of the time was immortalized by JOHN STEINBECK, THE
GRAPES OF WRATH-an excellent reminder of the situation for the average family in that time.
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successful than America in keeping the ravages of a severe economic
downturn from destroying people and communities. People still have
jobs, there is no threat of rebellion, consumers can still buy and the
economy continues to work because of its consumers even though it
continues to suffer severe problems.271
By way of contrast, in the Great Depression of the 1930's, Ameri-
can society suffered greatly. Its workers had no money to spend and
vast multitudes were reduced to utter poverty. Unlike the Anglo-
American model which passed the costs of the economic decline di-
rectly onto the employees, the Japanese corporate model passes the
costs of the decline to the shareholders and institutional lenders.272
Indeed, in Japan nearly all the economic fluctuations have been borne
by shareholders who have invested excess funds273 as opposed to em-
ployees whose life's work and day-to-day livelihood are dependent on
their on-going employment. 274 Japan's legendary low unemployment
figures are a reflection in part of this model. 275
A further benefit may be its efficiency (opinion is quite varied on
the efficiency of Japanese corporations, depending on how one looks
at it). One area of efficiency is in the access that shareholders and
institutional investors have to information about corporate perform-
ance. They have much better and more direct access, and interest-
ingly, studies show that they act to remove inefficient managers at
least as quickly as European and US counterparts.276 Another area of
efficiency is in the very limited market for corporate control. This
market while supposed to improve market efficiency, is notoriously
It is hard to imagine anyone reading that work and puzzling whether families in poverty are
more concerned about efficiency in the market for corporate control and greater overall wealth,
or the need for a basic income.
271. The rate of Japanese unemployment has reached a record high of 5.2%, something share-
holder primacy model economies and governments normally only dream of. See FIN. TIMES 1
(Apr. 25, 2003). As well, this is a source of inefficiency referred to as "excess manpower."
Kester, supra note 248, at 260.
272. See e.g., R. Wade, Joe Stiglitz's Bum Rap, 25:5 J. OF POLICY MODELING (2003).
273. Or savings. I use the term "excess funds" to emphasize that these funds are not needed
for day to day living, and hence, "excess."
274. MURRAY DOBBIN, THE MYTH OF THE GOOD CORPORATE CITIZEN 74 at note 29 (1998)
(citing Columbia University economist Frank Lichtenberg, In a Downturn, Cut Profits Before
Jobs, N. Y. TIMES 13 (Feb. 16, 1992).
275. Recent unemployment figures for Japan are 5.2% "Japan PM: Economy emerging from
slowdown," Monday, January 5, 2004 e Associated Press, compared to United States' current
accurate figure of nearly 9.2%, Bob Herbert, The White-Collar Blues, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 29,
2003).
276. Kester, supra note 248, at 239.
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expensive, and of questionable long-term value. 277 In Japan it is
nearly non-existent. 278
2. Drawbacks of the Japanese Model
The main problem with the Japanese model is that the support pro-
vided by the collectivist approach makes it difficult to deal effectively
with underperforming assets.279 Japanese corporate restructurings do
not cut costs, or change much in the corporation other than the man-
agement team.280 Japanese corporations tend to hold onto their cash
instead of reinvesting it into the economy. 281 Furthermore, the Japa-
nese system tends to burden suppliers and entrepreneurs with the
debts of failed businesses.282 In summary, the main drawback is that
Japanese corporations do not have the same level of efficiency in
other areas.283 Nevertheless, while some economists have argued that
Japan's model has not made the most efficient use of economic re-
sources,284 as we have seen, at least to the Japanese, efficiency is not
the measure of all things.
3. Implications of the Japanese Model for the Future
The Japanese model offers some very attractive alternatives for
keeping an economy and society functioning during difficult economic
times. Even more appealingly, the model does so without undue
stress on the government treasury. Many governments are not
wealthy and have difficulty meeting even their basic social security
obligations. By forcing the corporation to internalize more of these
277. Walker, supra note 200; Kester, supra note 248, at 239. See for a very thorough specific
industry example of financial institutions, which should be the best evidence of the claim made
for the market for corporate control, Robert DeYoung, Bank Mergers, X-efficiency, and the Mar-
ket for Corporate Control, 23 (1) MANAGERIAL FIN. 32 (1997), and the general opinion that it
does not work as a basis for precluding it from developing in Less Developed Countries, in Ajit
Singh & Bruce A Weisse, Emerging Stock Markets, Portfolio Capital Flows and Long-Term Eco-
nomic Growth: Micro and Macroeconomic Perspectives, 26(4) WORLD DEVELOPMENT 607 (Apr.
1998).
278. See Nottage, supra note 267.
279. Noted in Wade, supra note 273.
280. Id.
281. Kester, supra note 248, at 260.
282. K. Aichi & K. Yakushiji, Can Japan's Politics Save Japan's Economic Troubles?, Center
For Strategic & International Studies, Feb 27, 2002, available at http://www.csis.org/japan/
020227aichi.pdf.
283. Aoi, supra note 217, at 245.
284. The argument is made that the market for corporate control is stifled by the cooperation
of companies with each other reducing efficiency by keeping afloat companies that should be in
bankruptcy. See e.g., Economist Mar. 2002 in which the banking argument is made.
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costs, workers and society can be spared the worst effects of economic
downturns.
XI. VISIONS OF THE FUTURE
A. Peter Drucker
Peter Drucker, as previously indicated, is arguably the world's fore-
most management theorist. He suggests in his provocative article,
"Will the Corporation Survive? Yes, But Not As We Know It" that in
the foreseeable future there will be some profound changes to the cor-
poration. Drucker opines that the corporation will increasingly rely
on a few professional managers whose power will increase exponen-
tially. The majority of the work will be out-sourced to tightly con-
trolled suppliers. This "dispersed model" of the corporation poses
significant challenges for the legal and financial system, not to men-
tion society as a whole. The "dispersed model" with its higher con-
centration of power and corollary lower level of participation
exponentially increases the risks of managerial abuse of power, both
in terms of financial malfeasance, and in the political arena.
Drucker notes that this "dispersed model" is not new but has histor-
ical precedents in Europe. What is new, however, is the context in
which it now occurs-a loose non-affiliated corporate culture. This
dispersed model also has parallels in multinational corporations.
While some scholars fear that the regulatory issues2 85 raised by multi-
nationals may ultimately prove to be insurmountable, 286 the multi-
national and the regulatory problems they pose appear to be here to
stay, and if Drucker is correct, we may see more of the same type of
problems in the domestic market. Future legal developments must
take this into account and should be forward looking anticipating
some of the issues this will raise. Of course, law is a backwards look-
ing enterprise examining previous cases and old doctrines. This orien-
tation makes the future doubly challenging.
B. Michael Jensen
Another important business thinker, Michael Jensen, wrote an even
more radical article entitled, "Eclipse of the Public Corporation. '28 7
While Jensen's predictions have turned out to be nearly completely
incorrect-his hypothesis of a dramatic increase of leveraged buy-outs
285. DINE, supra note 3.
286. See e.g., J.DINE, & J. DUNNING, GOVERNMENTS, GLOBALIZATION, AND INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS (1999).
287. M. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARVARD BUS. REV. 61 (Sept. 1989).
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has not been borne out-his article bears merit in that it points out
the possibilities for a similar concentration of power. If such power is
available for an extended time in the marketplace, what risks does it
create for the economy in terms of creating monopolies of power, fur-
ther corruption of government by special interest groups, and concen-
tration of wealth and resources? 288 These are important issues given
the social wealth justification for the shareholder primacy model cor-
poration on the one hand and the increasingly skewed distribution of
society's resources through concentrations on the other.289
XII. CONCLUSION
Each of the models of the corporation is informed by and heavily
dependent upon values. It is imperative that the values incorporated
in each of the models be put forth and made the centre of the de-
bate.290 To fail to do so is to permit the incomplete work of the posi-
tivist neo-classical economist to create a normative vision for society.
It permits the considerations of wealth to determine the path of hu-
mankind. A wealth focus offers no justice, no hope and ultimately
undermines our humanity. As long as humans hold anything other
than wealth maximization dear, the need to permit law, indeed to in-
cite law, to include other values and form society must exist and the
value of economic analysis kept in its place. Law has considerable
ground to cover both in theory and in its development even to reach
today, and increasingly central to law's mandate as the guardian of
justice, hope and society is this issue of corporate modelling.
288. Interestingly, this concentration has occurred in both Germany and Japan, but perhaps in
part because of the models discussed, the impact has not been as negative. Jensen observed that
the bought-out corporations were usually returned to the public market within a few years.
289. Distributive justice is a primary concern for lawyers and a secondary concern, at best,
among economists. Economists deal with this issue as secondary to the primary objective of
increasing wealth. The wisdom and acceptability of this approach is coming increasingly under
attack even among economic scholars. See for example, the new journal, the Journal of Eco-
nomic Inequality.
290. As Michael Bradley, et al, observe, "The deepest challenge then is to find a way to enact
communitarian sentiments in a contractarian world." in The Purposes and Accountability Of The
Corporation In Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance At A Crossroads, 3(9) LAw AND
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 62 (1999).
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